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Introduction 
To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking 
the enemy’s resistance without fighting” 
  From The Art of War by Sun Tzu, Chapter III.2 
 
Theme and background 
Identity is political. In a discourse analytical perspective, national identities are 
constitutive, relational and situational and depend upon interactions with other 
nations, a retelling of the past, and a careful defining of the present for their 
substance. Identity plays a role in determining patterns of interaction, particularly 
in relation to conflicts, and in defining what is acceptable and preferable ways to 
interact (Neumann 2001: 124-126). Governments are sensitive to the perception 
of their state’s national identity and invest considerable effort in shaping, 
protecting, and honing it on the international arena. In recent years, the People’s 
Republic of China has faced increasing problems on this arena, particularly with 
relation to the United States, that can be partially ascribed to national identity 
perception or ethos. The Current, the mood in the US is ambivalent, but swaying 
towards hostility to China. In response to the darkening mood, Beijing has 
embarked on a campaign to change the country’s tarnished image. It is this 
diplomatic self-promotion and ethos-construction that I begin to study in this 
thesis.  
Since opening up in 1979, China has experienced an annual economic 
growth of almost 10 percent. At the end of 2005, the Chinese were enjoying an 
annual growth of 10.2, a significant foreign trade surplus of US$ 90.8 billion, and 
supported a large proportion of US foreign debt. This trend shows no sign of 
slowing despite outside pressure on the Chinese authorities to cool down the 
economy. China now support the world’s fourth largest economy, ahead of 
France and Italy (BBC News 2006: 25/01; BBC News 2006:9/01; BBC News 
2005: 12/12).  
This stellar economic growth has enabled the Chinese authorities to 
improve their capabilities in many areas, most notably in the military, diplomatic 
and trade sectors, with ever rising military expenditure and more political and 
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trade ties with countries around the world. Though Beijing argues that China is 
still a developing country, the assumption that it is becoming a great power has 
become close to conventional wisdom among scholars, expert commentators and 
policymakers in the West (Jacques 2005). The argument over what the growth of 
Chinese power and influence will mean for the world is gaining momentum, but I 
argue that no single view has yet become what Stuart Hall calls a ‘dominant 
discourse’. However, voices warning of a “China threat” are gaining the ear of 
policymakers in the United States, and moves have been made to prevent China 
gaining influence on the US market. In mid-2005, the Chinese oil giant CNOOC 
was forced to back down from bidding for the US oil and gas producer Unocal 
because of “unprecedented political opposition” related to “security concerns” on 
the American side (BBC News 2005: 2/08). By 2005 the US trade deficit, much of 
it with China, has reached an all time high of 6.4 percent of the total value of the 
US economy that year. This imbalance, which is also felt in the EU, has led to a 
great deal of political unease on both sides of the Atlantic and has sparked rows 
with China over the openness of international trade (BBC News 2006: 26/03; 
BBC News 2005: 25/04).  
In this thesis I shall review the main theoretical assumptions underlying the 
discourse about the impact of China’s growth on the world, and relate this to 
China’s diplomatic discourse in 2005. I view the study of ethos-building to be 
central to the diplomatic discourse and behaviour, but this is a neglected area in 
the study of Chinese foreign policy  and studies of perceptions and 
misperceptions are favoured (Wang 2005: 98 n5). Some commentators, such as 
Evan Medeiros (2004) and Robert Suettinger (2004), have commented on the use 
certain phrases, such as a “peaceful rise”, but few have conducted systematic 
studies of Chinese rhetoric in foreign policy discourse. In this thesis I begin to 
address this issue by suggesting one avenue by studying Chinese national ethos-
building in an international context based on Jervis (1989) and Kunczik’s (1997) 
discussions of the significance of image in international relations. I can identify a 
shift in the content, character and execution of Chinese diplomacy and foreign 
policy behaviour which began in 1997. The shift pivoted post September 11, 2001, 
and after the appointment in 2002 of a new central leadership in the Chinese 
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Communist Party (CCP). I discuss how these factors have led to significant 
changes in outward-directed foreign policy discourse. To do this, I analyse 
discursively texts produced by three central figures in the PRC – President Hu 
Jintao, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, and the President’s academic advisor, Zheng 
Bijian. This fourth generation of CCP leaders has a different approach to foreign 
policy than the previous generations. Their stance is emerging at the same time as 
the global perception of China is shifting.  
 
Research Problem 
How do the Chinese authorities communicate China’s foreign policy intentions 
since the changeover of central leadership in 2002-2003?  This was the original 
research problem for the thesis and is still the basis for the other research 
questions. However, it became clear that the discursive preconditions for or social 
practices of the Chinese foreign policy discourse are so complex and integral to 
the discourse I want to study, that the first research problem had to be dissected 
and fine-tuned using several sub questions. This thesis therefore also concerns 
itself with first, the US discourse on Chinese foreign and domestic politics and 
development as it unfolds. And second, with the particulars of Chinese history 
and social practice that have an impact on political behaviour. An updated 
research problem may therefore be phrased as follows: 
What characterizes the Chinese foreign policy discourse as a form of ethos construction, and how 
does it relate to the US discourse on China? 
 
This question is based on the problem of how international actors draw inferences 
about another actor based on the actor’s behaviour and how actors may influence 
the inferences others draw. The solutions to these problems are what Jervis (1989: 
3) alls image and image building but which I shall call ethos  and ethos-construction.
Because the discourse is still under development and we may only be at the 
beginning of a debate that may become more significant in the years to come, the 
thesis can only be exploratory. Furthermore, my thesis is exploratory in the sense 
that little academic work is performed on the issue of Chinese ethos-construction 
in foreign policy, though the subject is well know from studies of other countries. 
It is important to emphasize that I shall not study discourse in the Gramscian 
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sense of uncovering hegemonic ideologies and revealing false consciousness on 
either side of the debate. Rather, I shall seek to shed light on basic values and 
orientations in Chinese foreign policy, particularly as a response to competing 
values and orientations emerging from the US.  
As I want to discuss the relationship between the international and in 
particular the US discourse on China’s development, I need to link this with 
general debates in political science on relations of power, causes of conflict, and 
motivations for peace. The theories employed in the China debate in political 
science are roughly divided into the realist and liberal schools of thought. From a 
theoretical standpoint, these schools of thought take oppositional views of China’s 
growth and future intentions. On the one hand, realist theory adheres to the 
‘China threat’ lobby, which sees China as a future challenger to U.S. hegemony 
and an aggressor in world politics because of its new-found strength. Liberal 
theory, on the other hand has a mixed view of China’s future, seeing both 
potential problems of regime transitions and incentives for peace because of 
interdependence. The research task is to specify the connection between these 
discourses and China’s ethos-construction efforts. 
 
I therefore base the analysis on the assumption that the issue choices of the 
Chinese authorities and the choices they make with regard to facework, 
rhetoric and genre are founded in the assumptions evident in the 
theoretical debate and reflected in international discourse on China’s 
future. Chinese authorities and policy advisers are highly aware of the academic 
and political debates and respond to these. Zheng Bijian addresses US concerns 
directly by denying China will ever pose a threat to the international community, 
that the country does not wish to exclude the United States, and that China does 
not seek hegemony or predominance in world affairs (Zheng 2005: 24) 
 
Theory and method 
The focus of study in this dissertation is how one state attempts to project a 
certain image of itself and its intentions; itsuse of rhetoric, genre and facework in 
the process, and how this effort is linked to the discourses and policies emerging 
from other states. Here, the Chinese state, the ruling party and key politicians are 
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seen as one actor. In the analytical chapter I use terms borrowed from the theory 
of rhetoric, genre study, and Brown and Levinson’s (1987) theory of politeness as 
facework. These terms and theories are a part of the discourse analysis work as 
proposed by Fairclough (1992). Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is 
a particular direction within the diverse field of discourse analysis. Fairclough has 
a clear political agenda and often concerns himself more with politics and critiques 
of power relations related to globalization, neoliberalism, commodification and 
the production of social inequalities. I do not have the same agenda in my analysis 
and attempt to maintain an awareness of the prejudices that may be present in the 
CDA method.  
Discourse analysis is a post-positivistic method which uses language and 
other social practices as a basis for analyzing meaning as a part of the social world 
where meaning is produced (Neumann 2001: 38). Fairclough has divided CDA 
into three dimensions - social practice, discourse practice and text – and goes 
from a macro to a micro level of analysis. Each dimension overlaps and involves a 
progression from interpretation to description and back to interpretation again 
(Fairclough 1992: 231). For an effective analysis, it is necessary to present the 
complexity of the context or what Fairclough calls social practice. I have selected 
two areas of social practice which I shall use as tools in my analysis. First, I 
consider the US relations with China and the theoretical political discourse on 
which they are founded. Second, I consider the historical and philosophical 
underpinnings of Beijing’s current foreign policy.
  
Sources 
Discourse analysis is a text-based analytical tool as I am primarily concerned with 
analyzing diplomatic texts as a form of political action, my research material 
consists of three published texts. I look at the interaction and interrelationship 
between two competing discourses. First I look at the more abstract international 
relations discourses on power and conflict potential, and then I discuss how these 
discourses are reflected in US foreign policy. Further, I discuss Chinese history 
and culture as it is applicable to rhetoric and foreign policy practice in the PRC. I 
establish this mainly by using academic and secondary sources. Secondly, I 
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examine Chinese diplomatic publications from 2005 using primary sources. My 
main sources consist of two speeches and one article emerging from Beijing’s top 
leadership. I have based the selection of the three main texts I shall analyze on the 
authority of the authors, the centrality of the medium through which they were 
published, and the extent to which they are referred to as important by Chinese 
state news media such as the China Daily and Xinhua News Agency. The authors 
are prominent in Chinese politics and their opinion is certain to be noticed by 
policy makers, expert commentators and scholars alike. I have, as far as possible, 
reviewed other texts by the same actors from the past year in order to compare 
the rhetoric and positions. However, the texts are remarkably similar except in 
terms of issues and style with differences largely attributable to the discursive 
situation. Two of the texts are clear examples of diplomatic correspondence as 
they are speeches given by prominent politicians intended for foreign 
consumption. The last text is an article published in a scholarly periodical by an 
academic associated with, but not part of, the CCP central leadership. This text is 
thus more ambiguous in terms of its intent and position in the official Chinese 
rhetoric, but I have included it here because the author is one of the minds behind 
the change in foreign policy. He is also often mentioned by international media in 
relation to Chinese foreign policy and as being a close associate of Hu Jintao.  
 According to discourse theory, it is not significant how close these texts 
get to the “true” direction and purpose of Chinese foreign policy thinking, what is 
significant is how they present it. Therefore, a critical evaluation of the of the 
sources is not as central as they might have been in a more conventional 
international relations analysis – the statements of the actors are interesting 
regardless of their relation to any perception of reality. 
 
Thesis outline 
This introductory chapter is followed by a discussion of theory and method as 
well as an introduction to the specific concepts I rely on in my analysis. In chapter 
2 I first introduce the foundation for the idea of studying national identity 
construction in international politics. Then I discuss the theory and method of 
 9
discourse analysis and the particular theoretical concepts related to the theories or 
rhetoric and politeness practices.  
 
In chapter 3 and 4 I account for the social practice and discursive environment in 
which the Chinese authorities work. I attempt to show the background which has 
influenced the current state of affairs for the perception of China in international 
relations and the fundamental differences that have affect the US- PRC 
relationship. This entails a discussion of the theoretical texts that constitute the 
most significant aspects of the US discourse on China, and particulars of Chinese 
cultural and political practices. I especially emphasise Chinese politeness practices 
and the centrality the concept of “harmony” and its related philosophy. In this 
connection I also discuss the transfer or traditional philosophy to the practice of 
Chinese politics. 
 
In Chapter 5 I analyse the three selected articles. Here I first present the recent 
changes in Chinese leadership and its effect on foreign policy making. Further I 
discuss the manifest consequences of the leadership changes in terms of policy 
practice as interdiscursivity and its effect on genre. Then I do a close-reading of 
the texts and discuss the use of rhetorical modes of persuasion as forms of 
facework. The thesis is brought to a close with a conclusion regarding the 
construction of the Chinese ethos, its particular characteristics as a response to US 
policies and Chinese domestic challenges, and how successfully Beijing has played 
the Western diplomatic game. 
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1. Theory and Method 
The softest thing in the universe 
Overcomes the hardest thing in the universe. 
That without substance can enter where there is no room 
  Tao Te Ching by Lao Tzu, chapter 43 
 
I do a limited study of recent Chinese ethos-building efforts using Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the tool of investigation. In CDA, theory and 
method are seen as one an I therefore gather them in one chapter. As I discuss 
below, the method relies on a number of theoretical concepts to describe language 
use in both linguistic and social terms. However, CDA is a hybrid method that 
draws these concepts from a number of disciplines, and can itself be applied to 
many different disciplines. The theoretical concepts I use to conduct and describe 
my analysis in an accurate manner therefore require particular explanation. The 
number of possible concepts that may be drawn into the method is also too great 
for me to apply exhaustively. Therefore, I shall present here a selection of the 
concepts I find most useful for my purpose, define them in a manner relevant to 
political science, and operationalize them in accordance with the prescripts of 
CDA.  
My central point is that the issues and subject matters political actors 
engage in and relate to are formed as political issues via linguistic communication 
(Mathisen 1998: 6). In this combined method and theory chapter, I shall begin by 
introducing ethos-building on the international arena. I shall then present the 
theory and method of discourse analysis as this is the overarching system 
underlying the discussion. After presenting my epistemological starting point, I 
shall give an account of a selection of concepts used in discourse analysis, more 
specifically Fairclough’s (1992) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and shall 
explain why I chose to focus on these concepts. First, I discuss CDA and 
discourse. Then I present the concepts of intertextuality and interdiscursivity 
followed by the theories of genre, rhetoric and politeness. Finally, I suggest how 
these theories relate to one another. The main emphasis is on the connection 
between particular elements of rhetoric and certain practices of politeness because 
the politeness concept of ‘face’ is important in any social interaction but is 
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particularly well-articulated in Chinese culture and rhetorical traditions (Locher 
2004: 60; Watts 2003: 25). 
2.1 Diplomacy and international ethos-building 
The ethos or image of a country on the international arena is an important aspect 
of a country’s foreign relations. This is because the perception others have of an 
actor may be a major factor in “determining whether and how easily the state can 
reach its goals” (Jervis1989: 6). The aim of international ethos-building is to 
appear trustworthy to other actors in the international system. Achieving trust, or 
a desired level of good-will, prestige and mutual respect are important factors in 
mobilising resources such as cooperation, credibility or access to desired material 
resources (Jervis 1989: 7-8; Kunczik 1997: 74). This kind of trust is becoming 
more and more essential to China as the country engages in the world economy. 
The shift in Beijing’s foreign policy approach which emerged after 1997 is part of 
a response to the adverse reactions generated by China’s rapid rise. Though China 
has not yet acquired clear enemies, prudence requires a strategy for coping with, 
or preferably off-setting potential problems (Goldstein 2003: 58)    
States go about the task of ethos-building through diplomatic 
representation abroad. Representation abroad functions as an opportunity to 
listen for key issues and relevant economic, social and political conditions. In 
addition, it can be used as a means to prepare the ground for new policies or 
initiatives as well as “reducing friction or oiling the wheels of bilateral or 
multilateral relations” (Barston 1997: 2). There is no specific ways in which a state 
can project a desired image because, in order to get others to believe in an image, 
a state must fully act out that image. That is, the state must provide some proof 
that the image is accurate. However, the link between actions and ethos is not 
firm and immutable, and even an accurate ethos or image is not automatically 
accepted (Jervis 1989: 9, 11). This is because states rarely provide any kind of 
proof of their future intentions, and ethos is partially independent of reality as 
states are often unable to convey their intentions convincingly (Jervis 1989: 9). 
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2.2 Discourse  
Discourse is a popular term used by many different scientific disciplines and thus 
has a range of conflicting and overlapping definitions. The meaning I am 
interested in takes a particular view of language as an element of social life which 
is closely interconnected with other elements. I have drawn this concept of 
discourse from Faircough’s (1992) Critical Discourse Analysis, which goes beyond 
mere linguistic understanding of discourse. In linguistics, discourse may refer to 
extended samples of spoken or written text and processes of producing and 
interpreting speech and writing in a situational context of language use (Fairclough 
1992: 3). In Foucault’s social theory, on which Fairclough partially relies, discourse 
refers to “different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice” 
(Fairclough 1992: 3), that is, a discourse may be a “particular way of using 
language and other symbolic forms” to reflect or represent social entities. 
However, discourses also work to shape themselves and other discourses as well 
as position actors as social subjects (Fairclough 1992: 3-4).  
The idea that signs and symbols – whether or not they are linguistic - do 
not receive their meaning from some objective reality but from a dynamic process 
of interpretation is derived from Saussure’s theory of semiotics. According to 
Saussure, signs get their meaning from each other. Thus language is not a static, 
unchangeable system. Structuralists like Saussure do not regard language as one 
system of meaning, but several, where meaning changes from discourse to 
discourse. The patterns of meaning are maintained and evolve through discursive 
practice. The maintenance and development of the patterns must therefore be 
sought in the specific context in which language is used (Winter Jørgensen and 
Phillips 1999: 19-21). The reproduction and change of meaning that take place in 
discourse are broadly speaking a political act that reflects, acts upon, or 
reproduces relations of power. Discourse is therefore not just a reflection of a 
deeper social reality, but rather social organization is a result of continuous 
political processes that takes place partially through language. In political science 
there is a prejudice that favours actions over words, regarding actions as somehow 
more important and real. But I argue that the study of issues of language and 
meaning, dissemination and interpretation may bring new dimensions to the study 
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of international relations that more conventional methods preclude. How events, 
actions and issues are labelled and defined linguistically is a political as well as a 
linguistic act. It imbues them with certain connotations that again produce 
particular perceptions that may have political consequences (Mathisen 1998: 1-6). 
An example of the political nature of name-giving is the difficulty of labelling 
disabilities. Whether someone is referred to as physically or mentally challenged, 
disabled or even retarded goes beyond a person’s medical condition. It carries 
with it connotations about the person’s place in society and how others should 
relate to them. This is particularly evident in the frequency with which labels 
attached to undesirable conditions go from being acceptable euphemisms to 
becoming jocular or derogatory terms with negative connotations.   
2.3 Discourse analysis  
Discourse analysis is a post-positivistic method which uses language and other 
social practices as a basis for analyzing meaning as a part of the social world where 
meaning is produced (Neumann 2001: 38). Fairclough incorporated these insights 
and has created a three-dimensional concept of discourse that forms the basis for 
his Critical Discourse Analysis. A discourse in CDA is simultaneously a piece of 
text, a discursive practice and an instance of social practice. First, the text aspect 
involves a linguistic analysis of a given text. Second, discursive practice deals with 
the process of text production and interpretation. Third, social practice attends to 
issues of the social context of a text such as institutional and organizational 
circumstances (Fairclough 1992: 4).  
  Language analysis, rather than analysis of, for example, media, prisons or 
the family, is the most common method because “changes in language use are 
linked to wider social and cultural processes” and its primary function is to create 
meaning (Fairclough 1992: 1; Neumann 2001: 38). CDA combines language 
analysis and social theory arriving at a more social-theoretical sense of discourse as 
the use of language as a form of social practice. CDA is a method for analysing 
texts or language use as a social act, and in its social contexts. The reproduction 
and change of meaning that take place in discourse is broadly speaking a political 
act that reflects, acts upon, or reproduces relations of power. Discourse is 
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therefore not just a reflection of a deeper social reality, but rather social 
organization is a result of continuous political processes that takes place partially 
through language. To operationalize CDA I make use of Fairclough’s (1992: 232-
238) dissection of the theory into central concepts. However, textual analysis in 
political science is a far more coarse application of the method than that found in, 
for example, linguistics. The following definitions and explanations are therefore 
greatly simplified to suit my discipline and space limitations applicable to this 
thesis. I operationalize CDA by dividing my analysis into three parts based on 
Fairclough’s three-tire model. First, I present the social practice or the context in 
which the discourse takes place in chapters 3 and 4. Second, I look at discourse 
practice and particularly focus on interdiscursivity genre and karios. Finally, I 
consider the text itself. Here I discuss issues of intertextuality and I look at the 
rhetorical choices and their implications for politeness behaviour and the 
significance of world choice. Elements of the three categories overlap. I look at 
this overlap in my discussion.  
2.4 Intertexuality  
As discussed above, texts are not made in isolation, but “draw upon, incorporate, 
recontextualize and dialogue with other texts”, establishing what Bakhtin calls 
dialogicality (Fairclough 2003: 17, 214). This process is referred to as 
intertextuality. Intertextuality may be explicit or implicit. That is, the incorporated 
text may or may not be attributed to the original source. Intertextuality is selective 
with respect to choice of events and texts represented. It recontextualizes the 
subject matter and orders voices in relation to one another. This ordering of 
voices is known as ‘framing’ or contextualising in relation to other parts of the 
same text. Intertextuality is deliberately selective in its inclusion, exclusion and 
ordering of voices. Examples of intertextuality where this is particularly evident 
include direct and indirect quotes and references to events, or ideas such as are 
frequently found in news article, scientific papers and political speeches 
(Fairclough 2003: 47-55).  
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2.5 Interdiscursivity  
Both intertextuality and intediscursivity refer to the external relations of texts. The 
difference is that intertextuality brings other ‘voices’ into a text whereas 
interdiscursivity, which Fariclough sometimes refers to as assumptions, reduces 
difference by assuming common ground (Fairclough 2003: 39-41). It refers to 
norms manifested in genres, activity types, style and discourse (Fairclough 1992: 
125). All texts invariably rely on such assumption to some extent because what is 
said rests against a backdrop of unarticulated common ground and common 
conventions. For example, using “we” in a text may assume that the addressee 
knows who “we” are and may accept being interpellated as one of “us”. The 
ability to shape this ‘common ground’ through the exercise of social power, 
domination or Gramscian-type hegemony is important with regards to ideology. 
(Fairclough 2003: 55-56).  
2.6 Genre 
Studying genre is the examination of the characteristics of various types of texts 
and the understanding what they accomplish in different social settings based on 
their production and presentation. There are varying concepts of what genre is, 
but in my discussion I stick to what Freedman and Medway (1994: 8-10) call the 
North American School as this is closest to Fairclough’s (1992: 125) 
understanding of genre (Freedman and Medway 1994: 9). This school derives its 
concept from a rhetorical tradition inspired by Carolyn R. Miller’s essay, “Genre 
as Social Action”.  
Miller (1984) proposes a dynamic understanding of genre that does not rely 
on closed syntactic or semantic classification. Instead, she suggests that “in 
rhetoric the term ‘genre’ be limited to a particular type of discourse classification” 
based on rhetorical practice as an open system that both responds to and shapes 
contexts (Miller 1984: 27; Freedman and Medway 1994: 10). This is an 
‘ethnomethodological’ classification scheme that “seeks to explicate the 
knowledge that practice creates” (Miller 1984: 27). The important feature of 
rhetorical situations for a theory of genres is that they recur. Recurrence is 
“implied by our understanding of situations as ‘comparable’, ‘similar’ or 
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‘analogous’ to other situations” on a large scale (Miller 1984: 29). We classify 
recurring situations into types, creating new types every time our old knowledge is 
not sufficient to label a new situation. The situation and social context gives genre 
meaning based on a hierarchy of rules for symbolic interaction. As such, genres 
are means of orientation - a way of recognising a particular communicative 
situation where a given genre is used to accomplish a certain task. Once 
established, genres become a relatively stable set of conventions or cultural 
products associated with, and enacting, socially ratified types of activity 
(Fairclough 1992: 126). As conventions, genres constitute the framework to which 
a text producer must relate. Already established conventions may constitute an 
important rhetorical precondition in any rhetorical situation, sometimes having a 
greater effect on the shape of a text than the situation at hand (Kjeldsen 2004: 
101). Furthermore, genres may determine not only how the speaker should 
respond, but also how the audience should receive and understand a text. 
Established conventions may come to represent institutions and actors in a way 
that serves to shape the expectations of the audience and guide the production of 
other texts from those authors. News is an example of such an overarching genre 
that relies on established conventions which again influences understanding and 
expectations. It has a well-know format, including language and layout, 
determined by the medium. It carries with it assumptions about the type of 
content and standards of production the receiver can expect. And it interpellates 
the receiver in a certain way that is common and recognisable between media 
(Kjeldsen 2004: 107).  
Miller proposes a hierarchy of meaning to guide the interpretation of genre 
in a given context. She locates genre below human nature, culture and form of 
life, but above episode, speech act and language. Placing genre in such a hierarchy 
avoids taxonomy, emphasising the meaning of genre as context dependent (Miller 
1984: 37-38). Furthermore, given that the rules guiding genre classification do not 
form a normative whole, the hierarchy of meaning is the basis of the 
operationalization of genre. I operationalize genre by asking a set of questions 
relating to the propositions suggested by the hierarchy of meaning surrounding a 
given text (Miller 1984: 37-38). I keep in mind the conventions the context implies 
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and ask 1) who delivers the text and to whom (who), 2) what is the social purpose 
of the text (why), 3) what is the expected content of the text based on the purpose 
(what), 4) through what medium is the text delivered (how), 5) when and where 
did the communication take place (when and where). 
2.7 Rhetoric  
Rhetoric is the art or technique of persuasive discourse. It is intentional, 
purposeful and effective communication intended to sway an audience to the 
speaker’s ends. The study of rhetoric provides a useful and particularly relevant set 
of terms and concepts that I will use in my discourse analysis. Because my 
research material is from political communication, I deal only with the deliberative 
type of discourse. The decisive factor in determining the type of discourse is the 
function of the audience. The audience in this case are judges of what action is to 
be taken in the future and thus the discourse is deliberative (Kennedy 1998: 6). As 
in the classical understanding of rhetoric, derived from Aristotle, Cicero and 
Quintilian, general symbolic communication such as visual images or music will 
not be included, though I recognize these as significant. They are, however, 
excluded because of space limitations. My analysis will further be limited to a 
narrow persuasio. That is, communication in situations where there is divergence 
with regard to experience, meaning and interpretation. Broad persuasio, on the 
other hand, includes any communication that presents an issue to an audience for 
consideration (Kjeldsen 2004: 15-17, 23).  
2.7.1 Kairos 
The Greek term Kairos (Latin: aptum) refers to the communicative situation as a 
deciding principle for the sender’s choice of active means, rhetorical strategies, 
style and so on (Eide 1999: 84). Kairos also denotes the correct or critical moment 
to present a message and what is appropriate in a given communicative situation 
(Kjeldsen 2004: 67-68). A consideration of kairos is relevant for all forms of 
rhetoric and communication in general (Kjeldsen 2004: 74). The concept is 
divided into external and internal kairos. External kairos includes an appropriate 
relationship between the speaker and the speech on the one hand, and the subject, 
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audience and speech situation on the other. Thus the rhetorical statement must be 
seemly, or decent and respectable on the one hand, and functional or suitable to 
the purpose on the other. External kairos is decisive for the effectiveness of the 
language (Kjeldsen 2004: 69-72; Cockroft and Cockroft 1992: 19). Internal kairos 
refers to the coherence between the individual elements of the text as a whole 
(Kjeldsen 2004: 73). 
I will use Kjeldsen’s (2004: 72) reduction of external karios into five factors 
in order to operationalize the concept: 1) the sender 2) the issue 3) the medium 
and form of expression 4) the receiver and 5) the specific circumstances as a 
means to operationalize the concept. The relationship between these must be 
appropriate and there must be consistency between form and content (Kjeldsen 
2004: 69-72; Cockroft and Cockroft 1992: 19).  
 
2.7.2. Modes of persuasion 
Classical Aristotelian rhetoric discusses three means of persuasion and the integral 
relationship between them. The means are called ethos, pathos and logos. 
Ethos is an appeal to the character and authority of the author, 
conceptualized as personality and stance. Personality is the image character and 
credibility the author or sender inspires in an audience. Any interaction involving 
spoken or written persuasion will inevitably begin with the communication of 
personality. Stance is the attitude a sender conveys in relation to topic and 
audience. In a broad sense, it is the set of values held by an individual or 
community represented as the sender of a message. Ethos is the most important 
of the means of persuasion because it is decisive for the way people listen to and 
absorb the message. (Cockroft and Cockroft 1992: 19-21; Kjeldsen 2004: 117). 
 However, ethos is not a fixed quality. It is subject to change and is 
dependent on surrounding events and conditions. The sender comes into a 
communicative situation with one ethos, generates a new state of this ethos during 
the event, and leaves with an ethos that is a combination of the initial and the 
derived ethos. The initial ethos is a precondition for the desired reception of a 
message to be achieved. Its persuasive appeal is determined by the perceived 
 19
degree of relevance of the sender’s background and personal characteristics. For 
example, a scientist will achieve a greater degree of credibility than a layman when 
presenting an issue within the scientist’s field of expertise. During the 
presentation, ethos development depends on the audience’s response to the 
sender’s subject matter and rhetorical choices. If the sender establishes common 
ground with the audience by, for example, taking a political stance with which 
they agree, or substantiating claims with credible data, the audience will more 
readily accept the message. The final impression the receiver has of the sender’s 
ethos when the communication is over is the product of the exchange between 
the initial and derived ethos.  (Kjeldsen 2004: 116-117, 122-131; Eide 1999: 64).  
Communication can be issue-oriented or ethos-oriented. In ethos-oriented 
communication the sender is primarily concerned with generating and 
strengthening his or her ethos. In issue oriented communication the sender takes 
advantages of ethos in order to influence the attitude of the audience with regard 
to a given issue.  
Pathos is an appeal based on emotion designed to engage the audience - 
playing on emotions in order to effect persuasion. How an audience feels about an 
issue relates to their understanding of it, thus determining how they perceive the 
arguments and the sender. Effective persuasion is unlikely to take place without 
the activation of emotion. The persuader needs to actualize the desired emotions 
in the appropriate intensity, clarity, and sharpness of focus. However, conveying 
the appropriate emotion may be difficult in interactions between actors whose 
ideas and feelings are divergent (Cockroft and Cockroft 1992: 9, 40). US President 
George Bush’s reference to “the Axis of Evil” in his 2002 State of the Union 
address is a typical pathos appeal because it attempts to generate fear and 
resentment in the audience, prompting them to accept the speaker’s position. 
Emotional appeal is a common feature of American political behaviour, especially 
of the last two Republican administrations (BBC News 2005: 26/09) 
Logos is an appeal to reason and logic, but not according to the strict rules 
of scientific logic. It relates to the way a text is structured rather than the nature of 
the composite arguments. Such appeals employ the presentation of data or 
arguments when demonstrating or seeming to demonstrate that something is the 
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case. Scientific writing typically employs logos appeal. They use discipline-
appropriate scientific data as the premises for a given conclusion. Arguments are 
presented either as inductive or abductive. Inductive reasoning uses topos to 
proceed from the particular to the universal. Abductive reasoning uses enthymemes, 
often presented as syllogisms, going from generally accepted principles or 
suppositions to draw conclusions (Kennedy 1998:6-7; Cockroft and Cockroft 
1992; 78).  
 
The above means of persuasion, not just logos, can take the form of a topos or an 
enthymeme. Topos or inductive reasoning refers to the point of common 
understanding between the sender and the receiver as the starting point for 
addressing diverging views. They take the form of particular patterns of 
argumentation either as general means of observation or patterns of 
argumentation, or argumentation related to particular issues. Arguments can take 
the form such as opposites (“if carbon emissions from energy production are the 
cause of global warming, then we must find other sources of energy to prevent 
it”) or refutal (“people say that coral reefs are damaged by greenhouse gas 
emissions, but there is not conclusive evidence to support the claim”), cause and 
effect (“if students receive free meals at school, they will be better able to 
concentrate on schoolwork”) and more (Kjeldsen 2004: 149-157; Cockroft and 
Cockroft 1992: 58-77). Third, topos can come in the form of standard arguments 
or commonly accepted truths and convictions known as loci communes. These 
are often expressed as maxims, clichés, proverbs or other forms of fixed 
expressions. They may be difficult to explore because they are often beyond 
discussion and some are characteristic of certain societies (Kjeldsen 2004: 158-
167). 
Enthymemes, or abductive reasoning, represent the efforts of rhetoric to 
convince through open ended arguments. It is characterized by being structured as 
a syllogism that misses one part of the argument, creating a connection to 
something absent by referring to something present. Unlike logic where one 
attempts to deduce a true conclusion based on true premises, the sender seeks 
through an enthymeme to argue for a probable conclusion using probable premises 
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with one or several of the elements of the argument remaining unarticulated or 
implicit. The argumentation is also less formal and removed from the strict rules 
of logic, and the arguments are always addressed to the audience in order to attain 
approval. The particular characteristic of the enthymeme is that it is constructed 
by the author and the audience together. The audience is invited to fill in the 
missing information, thus generating self-conviction, flattering and challenging the 
audience, especially when the enthymeme is in a shortened form. Enthymemes 
both create and require communality because it is taken for granted that the 
audience share the proposed values and attitudes. It is difficult to argue against 
because the premises are assumed to be so obvious they do not need explaining. It 
is also problematic because it means admitting to ignorance of the obvious, thus 
lowering one’s own social position, opening oneself up for attack and losing face 
(Kjeldsen 2004: 170-173).  
2.8 Politeness theory and Facework 
Politeness is the application of certain types of behaviour to ease the 
communication and relationship between actors to avoid hostilities, even if the 
parties are potentially aggressive (Brown and Levinson [1978] 1987: 1).  Fairclough 
(1992: 162-163) includes Brown and Levinson’s considerations of linguistic 
politeness in CDA because particular politeness conventions embody, implicitly 
acknowledge, and reproduce particular social and power relations. They may also 
serve instrumental purposes for the communicator, particularly in power-laden 
settings (Harris 2003: 27, 31). I will concentrate on the aspect of politeness 
behaviour known as facework. 
  The concept of face as a part of social theory was developed by sociologist 
Erving Goffman. (Watts 2003: 122). Goffman defines face as “the positive social 
value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has 
taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of 
approved social attributes – albeit an image that others may share” (quoted in 
Locher 2004: 52). Face can be equated with a mask or “public self -mage” a 
person tries to give him or herself in the course of social interaction. This ‘image’ 
may differ according to the particular situation. In addition, face is a social 
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construct that is a condition for interaction, but a condition that can be given only 
by others (Watts 2003: 105, 125; Holtgraves 1992: 142). Face can be “lost, 
maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction” 
(Brown and Levinson 1987: 61). People tend to cooperate in maintaining face as 
each actor’s face is vulnerable, and a threat to one actor’s face is expected to 
generate retribution. Brown and Levinson call the preoccupation with maintaining 
and protecting face ‘face-wants’ and ‘face-needs’ (Brown and Levinson 1987: 61-
62). This includes the “need to feel unimpeded, free, or self-determining within an 
inviolable, internal personal preserve, and the need to feel accepted, appreciated, 
or respected by at least some others” (Janney and Arndt 2005: 28-29) 
Brown and Levinson (1987: 62) divide face into positive and negative face. 
Positive face is defined as “the individual’s desire that his/her wants be 
appreciated and approved of in social interaction, whereas negative face is the 
desire for freedom of action and freedom from opposition” (Watts 2003: 86). 
However, “‘face respect’ is not an unequivocal right”, and there may be times 
when face may not be recognized. This makes face vulnerable, and Brown and 
Levinson assume that each participant will attempt to maintain the face of other 
participant. Watts (2003) identifies two types of strategies that address face. I use 
Watts’ classification rather than that of Brown and Levinson’s because I find this 
to be easier to operationalize and more conducive for organising the subsequent 
analysis. 
First, there are face-threatening acts (FTAs). In this group of strategies we 
can distinguish between acts that threaten the receiver’s negative face (e.g. orders), 
the receiver’s positive face (e.g. disapprovals) and acts which threaten the sender’s 
own face (e.g. apologies) (Locher 2004: 54; Watts 2003: 86). The second group of 
strategies are face-saving strategies, which may be applied to redress a situation in 
which a FTA has already been used. These strategies include such acts as noticing 
the receiver’s needs, interests or wants, using in-group identity markers and being 
indirect ( Watts 2003: 86-91). I add to this Brown and Levinson’s concept of 
positive and negative politeness as a way to further define face-saving strategies. 
Positive politeness is giving the receiver positive face by assuring that the sender 
wants to show respect for the receiver because he wants at least some of what the 
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receiver wants. For example, instead of using a direct statement like “Give me 
that”, the sender may say “Could you please give me that?”. Negative politeness 
addresses the negative face wants of the receiver. It is avoidance based on and 
consists of assurances that the speaker recognizes and respects the receiver’s 
negative face. Thus, it often takes the form of “self-effacement, formality and 
restrain, with attention to very restricted aspects of [the receiver’s] self-image, 
centring on his wants to be unimpeded”. For example, an indirect statement like, 
“I would like to do this” implies a hope or expectation of an offer from the 
addressee. Alternatively, the responsibility for an FTA can be minimized by 
pluralising. “We are sorry to tell you this bad news” is such a statement intended 
to remove some of the responsibility from the speaker, making the statement less 
provoking (Brown and Levinson 1987: 68-70).   
The choice of strategy depends on the social distance between the 
participants, their relative power, the possible pay-offs or disadvantages, and the 
relative ranking of the imposition in the cultural context. And these factors 
together determine the “weightiness” of the FTA. The effect of the acts is 
enhanced by the presence or absence of an audience (Locher 2004: 56, 66-67). 
 
The strategies described above are known as facework. This is the verbal and 
nonverbal actions undertaken to deal with the face-wants of other actors or to 
deal with face threats to self and to others and to make whatever the actor is 
doing consistent with face (Cupach and Metts 1994: 6; Watts 2003: 105, 125). All 
human interaction consists of facework of one kind or another, and politeness is 
an aspect that may be included (Watts 2003: 130). Facework may take place either 
through preventive facework or corrective facework. Preventive facework can for 
example be accomplished by avoiding face-threatening topics, using disclaimers or 
applying linguistic politeness as described below. Corrective facework may be 
accomplished using such tactics as avoidance, humour, apologies or accounts to 
explain the undesired behaviour (Coupach and Metts 1994: 6-10).  
I use the concepts of face and facework to explain the various features of 
language use in deliberative rhetoric. I operationalize facework in terms of specific 
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linguistic strategies described by Watts (2005) as the essence of Brown and 
Levinson’s (1987) face theory.  
2.9 Linking the theories 
The theories discussed in this chapter contain several parallel concepts that link 
the theories together and make it constructive for me to use them together to 
enrich my analysis. Some theories are also linked because one incorporates 
another. For example, rhetoric incorporates genre theory and Fairclough’s 
discourse analysis incorporates theories of rhetoric, genre and politeness. 
However, to my knowledge little or no work has previously been done to link 
explicitly the theories of rhetoric and politeness with one another. The 
connections I will make below have been alluded to by others, but I have found 
no systematic study identifying them as I attempt to do. For example, Lynette 
Hunter refers to positive and negative rhetoric in her discussion of ethos. She says 
positive rhetoric reveals value whereas negative rhetoric hides value (Cockroft and 
Cockroft 1992: 22). What is particularly important for me is that, while face and 
politeness are important in any communication, the importance of politeness is 
well articulated in Chinese tradition. Furthermore, they have a long history of 
studying linguistic politeness within the framework of rhetoric. As Lee-Wong 
(1999: 21-23) argues, “’easing the jolt’ was a major purpose of ancient Chinese 
rhetoric” to the extent that saving face or avoiding embarrassment was one of the 
principal functions in social processes.  
Below I will attempt to make an explicit link by referring what the above-
mentioned authors have concluded about the link between the theories and by 
drawing my own conclusions based on the ideas presented above. I concern 
myself mainly with this link between rhetoric and face as this is central to both 
Chinese culture - as I show in chapter 4 - and to my analysis in chapter 5. 
 
Genre is linked to discourse in the way they both evolve in a dynamic process of 
interaction between sender and receiver. Genres are communicative events that to 
some extent rely on recognition to be understood by the people belonging to the 
discursive community. Genres are thus typified practices that become predictable 
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categories. Discourse is realized through genre in social practice and activated 
through texts. 
 
The way I study politeness and facework in my thesis relies exclusively on 
linguistic behaviour, excluding body language and other types of actions. It is 
therefore natural for me to use the linguistic science of rhetoric to classify and 
discuss my findings. Watts (2003: 55) has also found this to be a useful link 
because of the parallel concepts and purposes. In addition, politeness, like 
rhetoric, refers to “ways in which individuals use language socially” to realize 
various social values, for example through forms of address, subjects for 
discussion or the use of linguistic ritual expression (Watts 2003: 1, 48). 
First, choosing the correct genre is a way of easing the communication and 
making the relationship between the communicators comfortable and well-
understood. This is also the central purpose of politeness behaviour. The 
appropriate genre not only included the formulation of the message but also the 
appropriate medium and the requirements of the social context. Opting for the 
wrong combination of formulation and delivery may endanger the face of one or 
more of the communicators and may jeopardize their future relationship if the 
faux pas is grave enough. Threats to a receiver’s negative face may be an 
erroneous judgement of the requirements of the social context. For example, 
choosing the inappropriate time or place to make a statement can make an 
otherwise acceptable statement problematic. Think of the difference between 
telling someone they have dirt on their face in front of an audience, and doing so 
in private. Depending on the audience, making such a statement openly is a 
potential FTA. In private, on the other hand, it is more likely to be received as an 
act of concern for the person’s face. Showing that one recognizes the appropriate 
relationship between the actors and that one knows how to appropriately deliver a 
message appropriately is beneficial because it takes into account the face-wants 
and face-needs of the receiver by showing the receiver that the sender wants at 
least some of what the receiver wants.  
 Second, in modes of persuasion, I perceive the concept of ethos as being 
the most central to politeness. Ethos contains much of the same as Goffman’s 
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concept of face. Both refer to personality or image, are attributed to the speaker 
by the audience, and are not fixed qualities. Both may be gained, lost and given, 
follow the actors from one interaction to another, and must constantly be worked 
on and maintained. Face strategies are similar to ethos in that they are socially 
created and maintained and depend on the audience for their effectiveness (Brown 
and Levinson 1987: 243). Face is also often used as a metaphor for individual 
qualities and abstract entities such as honour, respect, esteem, the self etc that are 
features of ethos (Watts 2003: 119).  A problem with an actor’s ethos also implies 
a problem with the actor’s face. If the audience does not find the sender to be 
credible the sender has no face and will have trouble appealing to common 
ground. There might, however, be a slight discrepancy between the two concepts. 
Whereas actors tend to cooperate on maintaining face for fear of retaliation, ethos 
is more easily and more subtly challenged because it relies more on unspoken 
perceptions, opinions and previous knowledge. Brown and Levinson’s ideas of 
face as divided into positive and negative rites, originally used by Durkheim, is 
also sometimes echoed in theories of rhetoric (Holtgraves 1992: 143). 
Third, using pathos or emotional appeal effectively requires familiarity with 
the knowledge, perceptions and ideology of the receiver. Without such 
understanding the sender cannot appropriately address the face-wants of the 
listener, for example while doing corrective facework. Think of the difference 
between the perception of US President George W. Bush’s speeches among the 
American people domestically, who view them favourably, and among United 
Nations member states, who  tend to view Buch’s statements as “hypocritical” 
(Burkeman 2006). 
Fourth, appeals to logos can be both preventive and corrective facework. 
An actor can present facts and arguments to prepare the receiver for a potential 
threat to his or her negative face, making it possible for the receiver to accept 
something he might not otherwise have accepted. Alternatively, it can be used 
after the threat to negative face has been made, by justifying the FTA with logical 
argument to as to offset the effect of the FTA. For example, a controversial 
political stance that some may find offensive can be justified linguistically by 
appealing to logos using data or arguments. It can even be negative politeness by 
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attributing the data or arguments to someone else. This means that such facework 
can be manipulative because the sender is rendered less open for criticism in that 
he is just the messenger – he is just retelling facts. 
Finally, topos or inductive reasoning, when performed successfully, is 
typical of addresses to positive face because it implicitly appreciates and approves 
of the receiver’s attitudes as the starting point of the argument. Particularly topoi 
in the form of loci communes can be such addresses to positive face because the 
sender may use fixed standard arguments or expressions that may originate from 
the receiver or the receiver’s ideological standpoint. This may of course be 
manipulative in that the arguments may be used for a different purpose than was 
originally intended, but because of the familiarity of the argument, the receiver 
may be less critical of its exact content and implications. 
Enthymemes as well as tropes and figures may appeal to communality and 
positive face, sometimes creating it or articulating it more than referring to it. 
However, since enthymemes leave out part of the argument, often what is 
supposed to be commonly known, such arguments may only appear to address 
the receiver’s positive face. Sender and receiver may in fact have a divergent 
understanding of the same arguments and assume different things to be the 
“obvious” undeclared information. Tropes and figures are often embedded in a 
particular culture or political ideology. Using such devices is a way of identifying 
oneself as a member of the in- or the out-group. Identifying oneself as an in-
group member implies an address to both positive and negative face because it 
draws on common ground and implies that the receiver will not need to fear 
FTAs. As sender and receiver are both members of the same group, FTAs may be 
less serious or at least more easily corrected among friends than adversaries. If the 
sender identifies him or herself as an outgroup member, on the other hand, these 
devices may take on a far more negative and face-threatening character than 
would otherwise have been the case. For example, the meaning of irony may be 
lost or euphemisms and metaphors may be perceived as disguised criticism and 
thus an FTA.  
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3. America’s China policy 
Both arms and armour are unblessed things. Not only men come to detest them, but a 
curse seems to follow them. Therefore, the one who follows the principle of TAO does 
not resort to arms. It is significant that in peaceful times, the place of honour is on the 
left and in war times it is on the right. For as arms are unblessed things, they are not the 
things that men of good character resort to. 
  From Tao Te Ching, the book of Tao by Lao Tzu, chapter 31 
The purpose in this and the next chapter is to place the subsequent analysis of 
Chinese rhetoric in its proper context. These chapters thus present the social 
practice that frames discursive practice and text reading. I here present the 
background knowledge, conventions and assumptions that allow texts to attain a 
given meaning for the receiver. This framework is especially important for an 
understanding of genre conventions. 
In this chapter I shall introduce the American understanding of China, its 
evolution, and its relation to political discourses on power relations. I present the 
general theoretical arguments and assumptions by studying the international 
relations theories that underlie and inform the current debate over China’s future. 
I am interested in these theories only as typified texts in US foreign policy 
discourse in and regard them from a structural perspective. That is, I do not 
discuss the explanatory power and relevance of the various theories, nor do I 
argue for or against any given theory. Rather, I argue that the theories below and 
their substantive arguments are reflected in the implicit assumptions and explicit 
policies of the US in relation to China. Chinese authorities in turn take these 
theoretical assumptions into account in their diplomatic activities, and it is how 
the authorities use and respond to the theoretical arguments in their ethos-
building efforts that I shall analyse.  
To illustrate the relevance of the theories in an analysis of foreign policy 
behaviour and discourse, I shall first outline the central development in the US-
China relationship from the American point to view. I then outline the theoretical 
arguments and point out examples of how the theories are reflected in US policy 
discourse. I devote more space to those theories which feature most prominently 
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in US and Chinese policy considerations. The Chinese approach is outlined in 
chapter four. 
3.1 US-China Relations 
The relationship between the US and the People’s Republic of China has been 
fraught with mutual suspicion, hostility and a general lack of understanding since 
the establishment of the PRC in 1949. From the beginning, the two had 
conflicting views on the status of Taiwan, the acceptable relations of power and 
influence in Asia, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party which governs 
mainland China, and US world leadership. Over the last decade, bilateral security 
disputes and trade imbalances have been added to the list of obstacles to a 
harmonious relationship (Sutter 2005: 26-27; BBC News 1999: 5/24). 
 
The United States took thirty years to establish official diplomatic relations with 
the PRC. After the communist victory in the Chinese civil war in 1949, the U.S. 
continued to support the nationalists who retreated to Taiwan. The US kept the 
communist authorities in Beijing in diplomatic isolation for over twenty years 
(Kho 1996: 2). During the years of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the 1960s 
and 70s, the two countries had no diplomatic links whatsoever, though they 
previously had maintained some contact through their respective ambassadors in 
Warsaw (Kissinger 1994: 719). Relations did not improve until US policy-makers - 
no longer “blinded by ideological preconceptions” - made Sino-American 
relations the key to their Soviet strategy under the Nixon Administration after 
1971. By linking policy issues, the Nixon Administrations used a dramatic opening 
to China as a way to isolate the Soviet Union and encourage a détente in the 
bipolar relationship, allowing for a series of major foreign policy breakthroughs 
for the US (Kissinger 1994: 719-720). Playing the China “card” paved the way for 
the PRC to take China’s seat in the UN in 1971, and gradually receive diplomatic 
recognition from the international community (Kissinger 1994: 728-729). 
However, normalization and resumption of official diplomatic relations between 
the US and China did not occur until January 1979, when President Jimmy Carter 
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reaffirmed the US commitment to the “One China” policy and confirmed that 
neither would seek hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region (Carter 1978).   
By the end of the Cold War, the US-China strategic partnership against 
Russia and the Eastern Block was no longer central to US foreign policy. Instead, 
the Tiananmen Square Crisis of 1989 initiated an era of serious strain in the 
relationship between the two. Official dialogue at the highest level was closed 
down between 1989 and 1997 due to a number of disputes. US dissatisfaction 
with China’s human rights record, it’s alleged export of missile and nuclear 
technology, the mounting bilateral trade deficit in China’s favour, and serious 
hostilities over Taiwan strained the relationship (Harding 2004: 179-180). The 
Taiwan issue reached a climax in 1995-96 when conflicts over diplomatic conduct 
led to a military mini crisis in the Taiwan Straits, prompting the US to launch the 
biggest military show of force in the region since the Vietnam War (Kennedy 
2003: 171; Havely 1999).  
The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis alarmed the foreign policy establishment in 
the US and prompted a reconsideration of the country’s China policy. Maintaining 
close relations with Taiwan – which Beijing regards as a renegade province – while 
supporting the PRC’s “One China” was, and still is, sufficiently vexing to the PRC 
to tarnish other affairs between the two (Kennedy 2001). In 1997 the Clinton 
administration tried to turn this around by reopening high-level diplomatic 
relations (Harding 2004: 179-180; Sutter 2005: 85). However, the “engagement” 
policy of trying to establish a “constructive strategic partnership” did not lead to 
moves in the direction of political reform in the PRC, as originally hoped 
(Harding 2004: 183-185; Childs 2002). Renewed concerns over human rights 
violations came after clampdowns on religious dissidents, and allegations of 
corporate and military espionage. The dramatic increase in Chinese nationalism 
and anti-Americanism after the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade 
led to the US government ceasing to refer to the relationship with China as a  
“strategic partnership” (Goldstein 2005: 147, 152).  
After winning the 2000 Presidential election, the Bush administration 
inherited a host of concerns over China. With no clear China policy ready, the 
administration interpreted China’s growing prominence as ambiguous, and dealt 
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with this uncertainty within a broader US international strategy (Sutter 2005: 85). 
Uncertainty over whether China would become friend or foe led to a far less 
solicitous approach to China, and a redefining the relationship as one of “rival” 
and “competitor” rather than “partner” (Sutter 2005: 85; Goldstein 2005: 157). 
Washington accused China of stealing nuclear secrets from US government 
laboratories, funnelling illegal campaign contributions to Democratic Party 
officials and of human rights abuses (Kennedy 2001; Childs 2002). The April 2001 
diplomatic stand-off over the spy plane incident appeared to drive Sino-American 
relations into a downward spiral (BBC News 2003: 10/29; Childs 2002).   
However, after the terrorist strikes of September 11, 2001, American 
priorities were reordered and there was a return to the rhetoric of “a constructive 
and cooperative relationship”, albeit with the term “candid” added to set it apart 
from the less successful Clinton policy (Goldstein 2005: 158-159). The split 
between those who wish to contain and those who wish to engage China was 
pushed aside post September 11 in favour of a less confrontational policy (Sutter 
2005: 28). Upon receiving support from China for the War on Terror, the US fast-
tracked the arduous negotiations to admit China to the WTO in December 2001 – 
a move which the US had blocked in 1995 thus preventing China from becoming 
a founding member (Kennedy 2001; Childs 2002). The Bush administration began 
cooperating with China on a number of issues such as terrorism, international 
trade and investment, transnational crime, environmental issues and North Korea. 
Washington has also come to recognize that China is increasingly becoming the 
engine of regional and global growth and that stable ties with Beijing are of great 
strategic importance (Lampton 2005: 321; Goldstein 2005: 184-185). 
In 2005, there were several signs that China had become an important 
consideration in US foreign policy, but that the mood towards China is now 
toughening again. First, the annual Pentagon report to Congress on China’s 
military power - which is always studied carefully in order to sense how China is 
seen in Washington - indicates a leaning towards the ‘China threat’ view (Marcus 
2005). According to the report, China spends about two to three times more 
money on its military than official figures admit, making China the worlds third 
largest military spender after the US and Russia (Pentagon Report 2005: 21-22). 
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Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said of the report that it “clearly points up 
the reason that the President and the United States government have been urging 
the EU to not lift the arms embargo on the People’s Republic of China” (Marcus 
2005). The shift is also clearly visible in the difference between the National 
Security Strategy (NSS) documents from 2002 and 2006.  
In 2002 the tone was positive overall, and spoke in optimistic terms about 
mutual trade relations, China’s growing power and partnerships in the promotion 
of peace and prosperity in Asia. It even acknowledges China as a developing 
country – a major sticking point in the WTO negotiations. Only a few lines are 
devoted to a disclaimer, which conditions the envisioned bright future on the 
emergence of democracy and political openness, cooperative trade relations and 
non-proliferation (NSS 2002: 18, 20, 26-28). In the 2006 edition of the same 
document however, the up-beat tone has vanished, replaced by lengthy sombre 
admonitions. While recognising China as an engine of growth and regional 
partner, Washington now urges China to open its markets and warns that it “must 
act as a responsible stakeholder that fulfils its obligations and works with the 
United States and others to advance the international system that has enabled its 
success” (National Security Strategy 2006: 21, 26-28, 41). The document openly 
questions the “peaceful development” rhetoric coming from Beijing saying that 
“mutual interests can [my emphasis] guide our cooperation”. “China’s leaders must 
realize, however, that they cannot stay on this peaceful path while holding on to 
old ways of thinking and acting that exacerbate concerns throughout the region 
and the world” (NSS 2006: 41). These old ways include non-transparent military 
expansion, mercantilism and the locking-up of energy supplies and support for 
discredited regimes because they have resources China wants. The US explicit 
strategy is “to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, 
while we hedge against other possibilities” (NSS 2006: 42).  
Second, US Congress has become increasingly xenophobic and protectionist, 
threatening trade tariffs against China unless Beijing float its currency to even the 
trade conditions. In 2005, the US ran the largest bilateral trade deficit of any country 
in history, and the trade war with China has become the overriding economic issue in 
Washington (Hutton 2006; Stewart 2006). Third, US Secretary of State, Condoleezza 
 33
Rice, has publicly encouraged a policy of containment of China among America’s 
allies, warning that China could become a "negative force" (Weisman 2006; Elliott 
2006). Finally, in early 2006 there was a dramatic shift in US diplomacy. Diplomats 
were transferred from their positions in Europe and moved to China and the 
developing world. There were 74 new posts in all, 15 of these in China, 12 in India 
and five in Jakarta. This illustrates the change in the way the US engages with the 
world. Similar reshuffling of diplomatic engagement is taking place among European 
states that are also refocusing their strategic considerations, though mostly regarding 
trade matters (Borger, MacAskill and Watts 2006). On Hu Jintao’s visit to the US in 
April 2006, the tension in the relationship was evident in the official diplomatic 
protocol. The US called it an “official visit”, not a “state visit” which would have 
been Beijing’s preference. The visit did not lead to any breakthroughs in diplomatic 
relations though US pressure elicited vague promises of “steps to revaluate China’s 
currency” and help restart negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program (BBC 
News 2006: 4/21).  
3.2 Political Theory 
The theoretical arguments discussed below roughly fall into the classical 
dichotomy between realism and liberalism. However, I must emphasize that the 
arguments outlined here are radical simplifications. Actual arguments rarely, if 
ever, conform to just one of the theories and the theories themselves rest on such 
simplifications. Discussions are informed by a combination of the below 
discourses, but vary with regard to the degree of emphasis on the various 
elements. It is difficult to divide the following theoretical direction into favourable 
and unfavourable views of China’s growth because all include some scenario that 
sees China as a threat. I have therefore chosen to order the discussion using the 
classical dichotomy between realist and liberal theories 
3.2.1 Realist argument  
The realist perspectives has been the most dominant tradition in thinking about 
international politics and it supports some of the most troubling predictions about 
the future of world politics with a rising China (Mearsheimer 2001: 55). The 
aspects discussed there concern the growth of Chinese power as structurally 
driven phenomenon leaving out possible influence by individuals (Li 2004: 26).  
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The overarching principle of realist theories is that all great powers worry about 
their power positions relative to other states (Mearsheimer 2001: 40). Power, 
though a troublesome concept, is commonly understood to refer to the military, 
economic and technological capabilities of a state (Gilpin 1989: 13-14). Latent 
power attributes such as abundant wealth, a large population and other material 
capabilities are prerequisites for building formidable military strength, and 
considerations of these capabilities is of critical importance to all states (Bert 2005: 
15; Mearsheimer 2001: 55-56). Other base assumptions of realist theories include 
the notion that, in a world where states are the principal actors, the international 
system is essentially anarchic (Bull 1995: 8). The lack of any central authority to 
govern the behaviour of individual states leaves them in a self-help system that 
forces states to coalesce against would-be dominant powers. In this system states 
seek to protect their national interests by maximizing their economic and military 
power capabilities. It is the structure of the international system of states that 
largely determines foreign policy behaviour. Thus the behaviour of great powers, 
including their rise to power and pursuit of hegemony, is determined not so much 
by the state’s intentions as by its capabilities (Mearsheimer 2001: 17-18, 40-41; Li 
2004: 26). Finally, states compete for power among themselves and this thinking, 
which dominates states’ calculations, is characterized by zero-sum thinking and 
may sometimes necessitate going to war, as this is an acceptable instrument of 
statecraft (Li 2004: 24-25, Mearsheimer 2001: 17-18).  
Branches of realist theories are described as offensive or defensive 
according to their view of the cause of expansionist foreign policy behaviour. The 
various theories agree that the distribution of power among nations is central to 
the cause of war, but disagree on when states resort to the use of force and what 
distribution of power best maintains peace (Copeland 2000: 1; Mearsheimer 2001: 
336). Defensive realists such as Robert Gilpin, Kenneth Waltz and Jack Snyder 
argue that states seek security and predict that states expand when they feel 
threatened. According to them, states have little incentive to seek additional 
increment of power but rather seek to maintain the status quo. States thus only 
expand because they must in order to maintain their security. Offensive realists 
like John Mearsheimer and Dale Copeland assert that states are concerned with 
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survival and that power is the key to that survival. Capabilities shape the 
intentions of states and the ultimate goal of any power is to be the hegemon in the 
system. A rising power is thus predicted to expand at advantageous moments 
against weaker competitors because they can, not because they need to  (Zakaria 
1999: 9, 18-22; Mearsheimer 2001: 18-20).  
3.2.1.1 Power preponderance and power transition theory 
Power preponderance theory and power transition theory, though distinct theories 
in the abstract, are difficult to set apart in the discourse on China. Many of the 
assumptions they make are the same and actors often use arguments from both 
theories. For the sake of simplicity and brevity I shall discuss these theories in 
tandem. There is agreement among theorists that a preponderant power in the 
system of states fosters stability and peace. “Peace is best preserved when there is 
an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged 
nations” (Mearsheimer 2001: 336; Organski and Kugler 1980: 19). They also agree 
that shifts in the relative capabilities in the state system” is an important cause of 
conflict (Organski and Kugler 1980: 19).  The leading state, or hegemon, ensures 
an international system of relative peace and security by drawing on its wealth, 
power and status to set the rules of the game. It assumes these responsibilities 
because the benefits of a stable system functioning according to its preferred rules 
outweigh the associated costs (Gilpin 1989: 145). Over time, the leading power 
may weaken its grip on preponderance and be challenged by dissatisfied rising 
powers that trys to alter the rule of the international system to their advantage. 
The two theories differ in their view of the conflict-causing mechanism that is at 
work at this stage of the process. 
 Robert Gilpin argues in power preponderance theory that, over time, the 
cost of dominance tends to rise, draining the leading power of its superior 
strength. Rival powers increase in numbers and strength, forcing the dominant 
state to “expend more resources to maintain its superior military or political 
position”. In addition, the military and economic techniques of the dominant state 
tend to diffuse to other states, redistributing power, thereby depriving the state of 
the basis of its success (Gilpin 1989: 145, 168-169, 176). As its relative power 
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increases, a rising state may attempt to change the rules of the international system 
to its advantage. The dominant power tries to restore equilibrium by changing its 
policies. In pursuing this, the dominant state may engage in some form of 
hegemonic war by attempting to eliminate the challenger or expand its territory to 
acquire a less costly, defensive position. Alternatively, it can reduce the costs by 
reducing foreign policy commitments - political, territorial or economic 
retrenchment. The first option may lead to overextension and subsequent decline 
while the second option may have adverse effects on relations with allies and 
rivals because retrenchment signals weakness and decline enticing rivals to close in 
and allies to waver in their loyalty (Gilpin 1989: 187, 191-194). 
Organski and Kugler argue in power transition theory that the conditions 
of the “crossover” period – the point where the challenger surpasses the leading 
state – and the degree of satisfaction states feel with regard to the status quo 
determine the probability of conflict. The potential for crossover is dependent on 
the relative power of the hegemon and challenger, and the risk of conflict depends 
on the level of satisfaction with the current and prospective new system felt by the 
old and the new leading power (Lemke 1997: 23-24). Dissatisfied challengers often 
had no share in the creation of the international status quo and the dominant 
nation is not likely to grant the newcomer more than a small share of the 
advantages it receive. Challengers seek to establish a new place for themselves 
internationally that grants them the place to which they feel entitled. Such 
dissatisfied challengers have often grown rapidly in power and expect continued 
growth thus have reason to believe that they can rival or surpass the power of the 
dominant state, and are thus unwilling to accept a subordinate position (Organski 
and Kugler 1980: 19-20). 
The source of war is found in the crossover period when the differences in 
size and rates of growth between the challenger and the hegemon are narrowing. 
The risk of war is especially high when the military power of a dissatisfied challenger 
or revisionist state begins to approach that of the dominant power. It is the 
interaction of the relative capabilities and the speed with which it happens, not the 
equality or capabilities in themselves that are destabilizing. When the power gap 
narrows, the leading state becomes ever more desperate to prevent a takeover, and 
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the challenger becomes more determined to succeed. If the development of a rival 
is slow, differences have a greater chance of being resolved, whereas if 
development is quick, both parties may be unprepared for the result (Organski 
and Kugler 1980: 20-21; Bert 2005: 15-16). It may be that the calculations of 
power leading to conflict are subject to misperception, but these may nevertheless 
provide a short-term explanatory variable explaining the onset of war (Wolforth 
1987: 381).    
 
The United States is the most powerful state in the system and China is 
regarded as the challenger - suspected of being dissatisfied with the status quo. 
Both power preponderance theory and power transition theory generate 
expectations of a capable Beijing demanding a larger role in the management of 
international affairs and thus intruding on the domains hitherto dominated by the 
US (Organski and Kugler 1980: 21; Goldstein 205: 82-85; Li 2004: 25). As Chinas 
military, economic and technological power increases, two scenarios are 
envisaged. Either the US may overextend itself and gradually be unable to devote 
sufficient resources to maintain its former advantage over it competitors. Or it 
may act pre-emptively to preclude a transition while it still has the military and 
economic advantage. The use of force then becomes more likely when either the 
Chinese challenger fields a stronger army in support of its demands for greater 
influence in Asia, or when the US tries to hinder a crossover (Goldstein 2005: 81-
83).  
The rapid rise of China implies a major shift in the distribution of power in 
the international system because of China’s enormous size in terms of its 
economy, population and geographical reach. The theoretical assumptions from 
the above theories are clearly reflected in recent US foreign policy discourse. The 
two National Security Strategy documents paint a picture of the US as the 
hegemon in the international system responsible for upholding the current 
international order - policing international agreements and maintaining peace and 
stability. The 2005 Pentagon report and the 2006 National Security Strategy 
especially echo power transition theory because they reveal unease on the 
American side with the speed and direction of China’s military modernization. 
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The documents do not explicitly say the US regards China as being a dissatisfied 
power, but it is implied by the insistence that China adjust to the international 
norms advocated by the US (such as democracy, free trade, open markets and 
shunning discredited regimes).  
3.2.1.2 Balance of power theory 
David Hume argues that the concept of balance of power has been well-known 
since ancient times but that the idea has several distinct meanings. Today, the 
most common understanding of balance of power is that suggested by Kenneth 
Waltz (Doyle 1997: 134). Balance of power theory draws on the logic of game 
theory, but differs from it in that “the stakes of the game are considered to be of 
unusual importance” and that “in international politics the use of force is not 
excluded as a means of influencing the outcome” (Waltz 2001: 205). Great powers 
balance, that is, they seek parity or stability, against states with intimidating 
military capabilities, because such capabilities constitute a threat to their survival. 
States seek balance whether or not they wish to because their goal is to survive in 
an anarchic system, and states can seldom make maximizing power their goal 
(Waltz 1979: 126-127). The logic of balancing suggests that the level of fear 
between great powers varies with changes in distribution of power rather than 
with changes in assessments about each actor’s intentions. Great powers also pay 
attention to the capabilities of rival states and their prospects of military 
advancement. “Thus, great powers tend to fear states with large populations and 
rapidly expanding economies, even if these states have not yet transformed their 
wealth into military might” (Mearsheimer 2001: 45-46; Waltz 1996: 114-115). 
There are two aspects of balance of power theory that deserve special 
attention: polarity and the security dilemma. First, polarity relates to the 
distribution of power in the international system. The debate concerns which 
system, the bipolar or multipolar, is the most dangerous or least likely to facilitate 
international peace (Waltz 1979: 129-160). Bipolar arguments concentrate on the 
risk of hostile overreactions to a single adversary. In bipolar systems imbalances 
may be righted only by the internal efforts of the two powers, but the balancing 
act is far simpler because internal balancing is more reliable and precise. There is 
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less chance of the uncertainty and miscalculation that cause wars because single 
states are less likely to misjudge their relative strengths than are opposing 
coalitions (Waltz 1979: 168; Waltz 2001: 198-210). In multipolar situations, says 
Mearsheimer (1990: 14) the number of conflict dyads is greater and deterrence is 
harder because imbalances of power are multiple. Complexity increases and there 
are more possibilities of miscalculations. In addition come the potential problems 
resulting from buck-passing in response to military adventurism.  
China favours a multipolar system and the fear is that China could be 
tempted to attempt military adventures to advance its interests on the basis that 
other powers would fail to balance it in a timely fashion. Alternatively, there is 
some fear of a Sino-American rivalry similar to the Soviet-American conflict 
during the Cold War (Goldstein 2005: 89).  
Second, security dilemma logic, derived from the prisoner’s dilemma of 
game theory, states that the anarchic nature of the international system makes 
states feel insecure and thus they take measures to secure themselves (Elster 1989: 
126-132). States arm themselves for the sake of security and set in motion an arms 
race cycle where each party feels compelled to buy more arms because an 
improvement in the security of one state is a threat to other states who then 
respond by arming themselves further. The goal is deterrence by means of a 
credible threat of unacceptable retaliatory consequence. None of the parties 
desires conflict, but the nature of the system makes it impossible to establish 
binding commitments and difficult to interpret other’s capabilities and intentions 
making the system unstable and susceptible to unintended provocation (Waltz 
1979: 186-189). This scenario is particularly pertinent to China’s interest in the 
South China Sea – especially Taiwan. Here, China’ improvements in military 
power projection capabilities and assertions of sovereignty over waters and 
territory under dispute (Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the Spratleys and Taiwan) could 
be interpreted as signs that China plans to undertake offensive military actions 
(Goldstein 2005: 90-92).  
Balance of power concerns were a clear motivation for the reopening of 
diplomatic relations and admittance of the PRC to the UN in 1971. As stated 
above it was Kissinger and Nixon’s explicit goal to use the PRC to balance against 
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the Soviet Union. More recently, China’s military development has to some extent 
invoked security dilemma thinking. The US realizes that its interests conflict with 
those of China and strategic uncertainties prevail about the advantages of offence 
versus defence. Furthermore, the lack of transparency, especially on the Chinese 
side heightens uncertainty and concern on the American side – as demonstrated in 
the carefully worded Pentagon report on the Chinese military (Goldstein 2005: 16-
17). 
The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) has 
warned Congress of the narrowing gap in the US’s advantage in economic, 
military and other geostrategic terms. Especially China’s energy policies cause 
concerns because of the environmental impact and the possibility of future 
competition for limited resources such as oil and gas (USCC 2005).  
3.2.1 Liberal argument  
Liberal theories are aligned along a spectrum and are less homogenous in their 
core assumptions than realist theories. Their common feature is their tendency to 
focus on domestic rather than international features, and take into account factors 
such as culture, ideology and political structure to explain states’ foreign policy 
choices (Doyle 1997: 208-209; Li 2004: 30). Furthermore, emphasis is placed on 
the importance of the freedom of the individual, especially the freedom from 
arbitrary authority (Doyle 1997: 206). There are three strands of liberal thinking –
economic, social and political – that each seek to explain how the effects of 
anarchy between states may be offset (Nye 2005: 44, 207)  
3.2.1.1 Regime perspectives 
The regime perspectives argue that grounds for worrying about China’s rise are 
not found in the distribution of power among states or the condition of 
international anarchy. Rather, they worry about the consequences of the nature of 
the political regime ruling China.  
Democratic Peace Theory, as proposed by Doyle (1997), emphazise that 
liberal states tend to exercise peaceful restraint, due to domestic institutional 
restraints on leaders, providing them with common strategic interests and landing 
them on the same side in impeding world wide conflict. They also share the belief 
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that use military force is neither necessary nor desirable when dealing with other 
liberal democracies because leaders of liberal democracies are seen as legitimately 
representing the will of their people and deserving of respect. Non-liberal 
democracies do not enjoy this freedom from foreign intervention from liberal 
states, and vice versa. Furthermore, authoritarian leaders “both stimulate and 
respond to an international political environment in which conflicts of prestige, of 
interest, and of pure fear of what other states might do all lead states to war” 
(Doyle 1996: 313-314)   
China is not a liberal democracy and is thus outside the zone of peace and 
its growing power would be internationally disruptive because of its assumed 
greater potential for belligerence. Liberal democracies would feel justified in 
adopting a confrontational view against a state whose leaders is neither 
constrained by representative institutions nor accountable to anybody but a 
secretive elite. Furthermore, an authoritarian Chinese regime would also be a likely 
belligerent in a great power war (Goldstein 2005: 93-94). 
Democratic transition theory as offered by Mansfield and Snyder (1995) 
rests on similar logic to that of democratic peace theory. It proposes that it is 
during the shift from authoritarianism to democracy that states are likely to adopt 
disruptive foreign policies. Democratic control over foreign policies is only partial 
and there is a volatile mix of elite and democratic politics potentially leading to 
“insipient nationalism and war” (Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 5-6). The ideological 
foundations of Communist China are eroding and the CCP’s tenuous political 
legitimacy is based more and more on nationalism. The growth of nationalism 
feeds fears abroad of a belligerent foreign policy in an attempt to regain ancient 
glory. Leaders may also tap into volatile nationalist sentiment in an attempt to gain 
legitimacy and popular support in order to outshine their competitors within the 
CCP (Gries 2004: 116-150; Zhao 2004 a: 248-249.  
The Clinton administration’s 1997 ‘engagement’ policy clearly reflects the 
democratic peace theory logic in its attempt to offset strategic problems by 
instigating democratic political reform in China. More recently the National 
Security Strategy documents declares in the opening letter by President Bush that 
leading the community of democracies is one of two pillars upon which US 
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security strategy rests. Bush declares the community of democracies to be essential 
to multinational efforts to combat cross-border security problems. This has 
changed from 2002 when democracy was declared essential for national success 
and that “America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economic 
openness” in both China and Russia (NSS 2002: 4). The 2006 document is less 
categorical, instead emphasising stability: “Because democracies are the most  
responsible members  of the international system, promoting democracy is the 
most effective long-term measure for strengthening  international stability; 
reducing regional conflict; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; 
and extending  peace and prosperity” (NSS 2006: 3) 
3.2.1.2 Institutional perspective 
Internationalist theory comes from the social strand of liberal theory and is based 
on the assumption of rational behaviour and argues that institutions can affect 
state strategies because they mitigate the effects of anarchy (Haftendorn, Keohane 
and Wallander 1999: 327). Institutions are said to “facilitate cooperation, modify 
state power, and alter the way in which states identify and pursue their interests” 
(Ikenberry 2001: 14). By stabilising expectations and lengthening the time 
perspective of the actors, institutions reduce the acuteness of the security 
dilemma. They do this in four ways. First, institutions provide a sense of 
continuity and generate expectations of future cooperation by imposing costs for 
defecting, establish standards and monitor conformity. Second, they provide an 
opportunity for reciprocity that allows for non-zero sum interaction because 
transactions over time are likely to balance out leaving no party worse off than 
they otherwise would have been in the long run. Third, institutions provide a flow 
of information and rules of transparency, making cheating harder to conceal. 
Finally, they provide ways and means by which to resolve conflicts (Haftenforn, 
Keohane and Wallander 1999: 7, 9; Nye 2005: 46).  Institutions are established 
largely because of uncertainty about other states’ intentions and likely strategies, 
generating a need for information. Through international institutions actors can 
influence how others see the world and be able to provide credible information. 
The establishment of institutions depends on the (expected) durability of the 
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problems faced and issue density and interdependence actors face (Wallander and 
Keohane 1999: 31-32). Wallander and Keohane (1999) also implicitly refer to the 
common values, cultural similarity and common interests that are necessary for 
successful institutional management of conflict. 
East Asia is far less homogenous and harmonious than Western Europe 
and North America where the strongest support for the theory is found. 
Conditions necessary for trust and cooperation, such as common interests, similar 
culture and an overarching transnational identity, appear to be absent from Asia. 
In addition, a preference for bilateral rather than multilateral approaches to 
problem solving, as China has shown in the past, precludes the establishment of 
more effective regional institutions (Goldstein 2005: 97-98). 
The US has sought to involve China in international institutions since 
allowing the PRC to take China’s seat in the UN in 1971. Drawing the PRC into 
the UN, the WTO and other international organisations has been an attempt to 
integrate China into the international economic system and to compel China to 
become a global player that behaves like a “responsible stakeholder” (NSS 2006: 
41). The motivation is that “China shares our exposure to the challenges of 
globalization and other transnational concerns” (NSS 2006: 41). International 
organisations is the avenue through which the US and China can manage their 
relationship because these involve both opportunities and obligations. 
Additionally, the organisations are regarded as vehicles for promoting democratic 
reform in partner countries (NSS 2006: 6).   
3.2.1.3 Interdependence perspective  
Interdependence perspective, based on the economic perspective of liberal theory, 
is one of the most frequently used discourses. It appears on the American and the 
Chinese side as both a goal and a motivation for policy. Interdependence, simply 
put, refers to mutual dependence characterised by reciprocal effects among 
countries or among actors in different countries (Nye 2005: 198). “These effects 
often result from international transactions – flows of money, goods, people and 
messages across international boundaries” (Keohane and Nye 1999: 7).  
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Interdependence can “originate in physical (i.e. in nature) or a social (economic, 
political, or perceptual) phenomena”, but quite often has elements of both (Nye 
2005: 198). However, such interconnections in transactions can only be called 
interdependence if the transactions are of significant importance to the parties 
involved. The degree of importance of a transaction to the parties may also vary, 
making the power relationship between the actors asymmetrical. Being less 
dependent can be a source of power, and actors may try to link issues to improve 
their bargaining position. Complex webs of linkages may also restrict the 
behaviour of otherwise strong actors because of the extended implications of the 
use of force. Much of the political conflict over interdependence involves the 
creation or prevention of issue linkage (Nye 2005: 203-204). Interdependence can 
also involve short-run sensitivity and long-term vulnerability costs, which may also 
be asymmetrically distributed among the actors. Sensitivity refers to the speed and 
effect with which changes in one part of the system bring about effects in another, 
as well as the associated cost of these effects. Vulnerability, on the other hand, 
refers to the relative cost of changing the structure of the system of 
interdependence – the availability and costliness of changing the rules of the game 
or seeking alternative solution (Keohane and Nye 1999: 10-11; Nye 2005: 200-
201).  
The theory of complex interdependence, developed by Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye, is a thought experiment in reversing the core (defensive) realist 
assumptions of states as the only significant actors, military force as the dominant 
instrument, and security as the dominant goal. In complex interdependence, 
transnational actors working across state boundaries may also be significant 
actors. Economic manipulation and the use of international institutions are also 
significant instruments. And welfare is the dominant goal. (Nye 2005: 207). 
Complex interdependence is characterised by multiple channels connecting 
societies, the absence of hierarchy among issues, and the minor role played by 
military force. The multiple channels connecting societies may be formal or 
informal interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational relations. The absence of 
hierarchy among issues arises from the fact that foreign affairs agendas are larger 
and more diverse. Conflicts related to energy, resources, environment, and 
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population impinge on one another and cannot be subordinated to military 
security. The minor role played by the military is due to the widened perceived 
margin of safety, particularly among industrialized, pluralist countries. Military 
force is often not an effective way to achieve goals of welfare (Keohane and Nye 
1999: 21-24). The alternative to hard military power is Nye’s concept of ‘soft 
power’. Soft power describes that ability of a state or other entity to influence 
another actor and get them to do what one wants. It is an indirect way to get 
others to want what you want without resorting to inducements or threats. This 
aspect of power rests intangible resources such as culture, ideology and 
institutions and leads, when successfully applied, to get other actors to want what 
you want. Nye (2005: 61) argues that soft power, especially the ability to set the 
agenda and to define issues, is becoming more important among postindustrial 
societies. By contrast, he argues that direct ways of applying power is more 
important in industrialising and pre-industrial parts of the world.    
Chances for conflicts in systems of complex interdependence may appear 
in two instances. First, in the case of drastic social and political change, force 
could again become an important direct instrument of policy. Second, “even when 
elites’ interests are complementary, a country that uses military force to protect 
another may have significant political influence over the other country” (Keohane 
and Nye 1999: 24)  
From this perspective, the U.S. and China may be described as being in an 
interdependent relationship. They trade heavily with one another, and, though 
China enjoys a surplus of exports to the U.S., it is also dependent on this export 
for continued growth. The U.S. holds the power to alter the system by e.g. 
erecting trade barriers, while China supplies goods wanted on the U.S. market and 
is also an important market for U.S. products. A dramatic change in the current 
relationship of mixed cooperation and competition could lead the current mutual 
suspicion to discontinue the current trajectory and move towards greater trust 
(BBC News 2006: 04/19). A severe reduction in international trade would 
significantly hamper China’s ability to sustain the high rates of economic growth 
necessary for the state to have any hope of emerging as a great power (Goldstein 
2005: 99).   
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4. Image, Culture and Political Rhetoric in the PRC 
“To achieve harmony is the most valuable function of observing ritual propriety. In the 
ways of the Former Kings, this achievement of harmony made them elegant, and was a 
guiding standard in all things large and small” 
   From ‘The Analects’ of Confucius, Chapter 1.12 
 
In this chapter I shall discuss the social practice which frames the subsequent 
analysis. I include significant political and cultural factors which influence Beijing’s 
behaviour. I especially concern myself especially with previous ethos-building 
efforts as the planned and continuous distribution of ethos bound information 
aimed at improving others’ perception of the PRC. This is not an effort to 
disclose “false consciousness” in the Gramscian sense, as Fairclough does, or 
“hidden agendas” as found in PR theory. My approach is closer to rhetorical 
theory in that I regard the actors as genuine communicator.  
I argue that, in addition to political and economic circumstances, culture 
and established social practices have an impact on the diplomatic conduct of 
states. Below I outline important features of Chinese culture and social practices, 
both in general terms and as they manifest themselves in foreign policy behaviour 
and rhetoric. I use a definition of culture found in anthropology and sociology 
that conceptualises it as being values, norms and behaviour or artefacts that 
together make a system of meaning whereby people interact with one another 
(Krieken et al 2000: 7). I study political behaviour in the Chinese culture in 
relation to Western political culture, as far as there is such a thing, by emphasising 
differences and adaptations. I point out how some key words and verbal 
behaviour have a particular meaning, which functions these serve and how their 
use reflects culture. However, cultural members are active participants that do not 
just abide by prescribed values and rules, but often choose ways around them, 
borrow from other cultures, or invent new alternatives to solve emerging 
problems. I therefore do not regard behaviour as a demonstration of static and 
unchanging cultural characteristics. Instead, behaviour is conceived as ways 
through which cultural members, using their particular coding systems, 
communicate and deal with the particular complex of problems before them.  
 47
I realize that using the above approach to studying Chinese political behaviour is 
problematic because I risk cultivating a view of Chinese rhetoric and culture as a 
peculiar other. However, I maintain that including the cultural perspective is 
important because, as Lee (2003) and Lu (2002) argue, rhetoric is culturally based 
in meanings and practices, and recognizing the differences “allows us to describe 
and evaluate a rhetorical system on its own terms and thus reduce the chance of 
imposing an ethnocentric view of rhetoric onto other cultures” (Lu 2002: 108). I 
look especially at politeness conventions because, as Fairclough (1992: 163) notes, 
investigating the politeness conventions of a given genre or discourse type is one 
way of gaining insight into social relations within the practices and institutional 
domains with which it is associated. Particulars of politeness conventions, and 
their use, implicitly acknowledge specific features of social and power relations. 
 
 In this section I shall first outline the particular characteristics of Chinese culture. 
The features on which I concentrate are based on Confucian traditions and 
stratagems stemming from Daoism and the military treatise “The Art of War” by 
Sun Tzu. These works form the basis of values, norms, and especially concepts of 
politeness that are well-know in East Asia. An understanding of these traditions is 
central to understanding the PRC’s foreign policy discourse as they inform much 
of their rhetorical behaviour. However, Confucianism was condemned during the 
revolutionary era, especially during the Cultural Revolution, and thus does not 
feature overtly in the rhetoric from this period. It is only over the last decade that 
Confucianism has been revived and has found an official place in political rhetoric 
once again, alongside Daoism and the strategic teachings of Sun Tzu. The ancient 
canons have been revived in the guise of nationalism because, it is alleged, there is 
a lack of new ideological orientation and thus a vacuum with regard to regime 
legitimacy after the gradual de facto demise of Chinese communism since the 
country opened up in 1979 (Seligman 1999: 52; Kang 2005: 58; Zhao 2004 a: 29). 
President Hu Jintao now refers explicitly to these philosophical traditions and they 
also permeate modern Chinese idioms (Watts 2006). Second, I briefly discuss how 
the philosophies above are incorporated into general rhetorical behaviour. Finally, 
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I provide a synopsis of Beijing’s foreign policy behaviour and rhetoric since 1949 
until the first two years of Hu Jintao’s leadership.  
4.1 Chinese philosophy and culture of politeness 
The philosophical foundations of the particular characteristics of Chinese 
behaviour are articulated in the teachings of the Chinese philosopher Confucius, 
dating back to the 5th century BC. These teachings form the ethical and 
philosophical system that emphasizes a number of virtues. These virtues are 
summarized in eight concepts that are what Wiersbicka (1991) refers to as 
“cultural key-words”, or words that are of particular importance in a given 
language, revealing significant aspects of the culture of speakers. These concepts 
are loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, love, trust, justice, harmony, and peace – 
known as the eight virtues. They form the basis of what is considered polite and 
appropriate behaviour in Chinese society and are the hallmarks of a true 
gentleman. (Seligman 1999: 52; Cortazzi and Shen 2001: 126). The Confucian 
ruler needs to be conspicuous and set a good example, and these virtues figure 
prominently in Confucius’ view of ruler and government. It is only by having the 
moral power of a gentleman that a government may hold the ‘Mandate of 
Heaven’, or legitimacy as a ruler (Bary and Bloom 1999: 27, 42-43) 
These virtues are expressed in the relationship-based social organization of 
Chinese society. Actors hold a particular status in hierarchic relationships which 
determine how they should behave with regard to others (Stockman 2000: 71-73, 
79). In contrast to the Western concept of an “individual” as an independent 
entity with free will, emotions and personality, the Chinese individual is defined by 
its surrounding relations or groups (Gao 1996: 83). Seligman (1999: 44) refers to 
individualism versus group-centeredness as “the single most important 
fundamental difference between Chinese and Westerners”. For the Chinese, the 
construction of the self tends to be interdependent. The importance of others in 
defining the self sets boundaries for the appropriate interaction between 
individuals and groups. It leads to a tendency to behave in accordance with 
external expectations or social norms, rather than personal wishes or integrity 
(Gao 1996: 84; Stockman 2000: 76). This group mentality also means that a real 
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premium is place on consensus. An issue may be debated at length, but when a 
decision has been made, individual group members are expected to fall into line, 
embrace the decision and act on it without question - at least overtly. There are 
real limits to when and under what circumstances it is permissible to express 
individual differences (Seligman 1999: 45, 47). This is visible in the particularistic 
nature of relationships, defining obligations to others based on the specific nature 
and network associations of a given relationship. The stability of society is built on 
unequal relationships between people based on the concept of filial piety and 
measured against the standard for ritual propriety. This is in contrast to the 
Western organizational mode of association in which members of the same 
organization enjoy clear and equal membership. Obligations to others are 
regulated by norms which apply equally to all members of a category, whereas in 
China, norms of ritual propriety depend on the particular relationship where there 
are no fixed groups with defined memberships. For example, a junior partner 
owes the senior partner respect and obedience, and the senior partner owes the 
junior protection and consideration (Stockman 2000: 73; Hofstede and Hofstede 
2005: 208-209). Furthermore, relationships and actions are thought of in long-
term perspectives (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005: 211). This can take the form of 
lengthy exchanges of favours to establish social relationship or connections, or 
guanxi. Guanxi describes the manner in which Chinese strategically employ 
relations as a social resource (Lu 2000: 14;  
Exercising ritual propriety is closely linked to the concept to “face” which 
plays a vital role in the established social code of Chinese culture. It can be divided 
into “moral face” and “social face”, but for the purpose of this analysis I treat 
them as one because they are used interchangeably as referring to the sense of 
being aware of oneself as a locus of observation by others.  The state of one’s 
‘face’ describes the confidence of society in the integrity of a person’s moral 
character, one’s social respectability, reputation and prestige. Loss of face may 
make it difficult or impossible for an individual to function properly within the 
community because it equals the loss of humanity.  
Face can be lost, gained and given and is of grave concern to the Chinese. 
However, an individual’s face not only concerns the individual but also the 
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collective, for example the family. “Face needs” therefore, serve to regulate a 
person’s behaviour. Maintaining face is a balancing act implying reciprocity – in 
looking after the face of others one ensures that one’s face is being looked after in 
return. This means that public conversations tend to become ritualized to avoid 
face-threatening situations, whereas private conversations are substantive (Jia 
2001: 39, Lee-Wong 2000: 21, 24; Gao 1996: 94-95; Seligman 1999: 53). However, 
“Face”, as Goffman points out, is by no means unique to Chinese society. Instead, 
it is a more well-known and finely-tuned concept explicitly referred to in social 
interaction (Stockman 2000: 78).  
Face is closely tied to the concept of liamo, or manners, courtesy and 
politeness known as ritual propriety. It is a code of conduct defining how one 
should behave in all situations, public and private - a part of normative politeness 
expected of individuals in any social interaction. Face and politeness in this sense 
are two sides of the same coin. Whereas face is attributive – what individuals 
accord to one another - liamo is prescriptive – what society lays down as rules to 
be observed. In observing social etiquette, the face of the other is attended to. 
Face maintenance is an ethical responsibility, while liamo is a social responsibility. 
The two concepts are intricately linked and it may be difficult to determine 
whether etiquette is strategically or normatively motivated. Observing the rules of 
politeness may be done for a variety of reasons, often to be strategic and to 
preserve surface harmony (Lee-Wong 2000: 25-26). Cultural norms hold that 
politeness involves showing modesty and humility, almost to the point of being 
self-deprecating. Value is placed on reserve and formality as well as on restraint 
and inhibition of strong feelings, because control of emotional expressions is a 
sign of maturity. Direct confrontation or criticism is seen as insulting or arrogant, 
behaviour that is likely to become a threat to someone’s face. The Chinese prefer 
more indirect ways of communicating, often layering messages with multiple 
meanings (Seligman 1999: 52; Gao 1996: 85, 91; Lee-Wong 2000: 19; Lafayette de 
Mente 2004: 179, 181, 183).  
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4.3 Chinese rhetorical style  
The traditional view of Chinese rhetoric is that it “always rely upon idioms, 
clichés, and set phrases”, offering repetitions of assertions rather than proofs and 
premises. The most defining characteristic is seen as the use of “indirection” in 
language and actions, and the concern about “avoiding the kind of overtness that 
leaves nothing subtextual” (Liu 1996: 318). Individuality and originality, much 
valued in the West, are replaced with the use of already established forms and 
phrases or what I call standard topoi in chapter 2. In short, the defining 
characteristics of Chinese rhetoric are seen to be diametrically opposite to 
Western rhetorical style and preferences. This is an exaggeration of the 
differences, however, and is only a starting point (Liu 1996: 318, 330).  
There is a lack of research exploring the specific areas of similarity and 
difference between the two cultures of rhetorical behaviour. In a stereotyped 
characterization, the differences may be found in a general lack of logic, 
depreciation of speech and audience centeredness in Chinese rhetoric, whereas in 
Western rhetoric the speaker is central, logical systems are well-developed and 
delivery is dynamic (Lu 2002: 8). Lee (2003: 365-366) found that native Chinese 
writers tended to leave some gap in the text for further interpretation by the 
readers, leaving out specific details and preferring non-specific references. This 
may be a part of politeness work or efforts to maintain social harmony (Chang 
2001: 156). Indirect forms of communication, using imprecise, ambiguous verbal 
communication behaviours may protect the participant’s face by being less 
assertive and more self-effacing. Aggression may be toned down or inhibited to 
avoid direct confrontation, and silence, negativism or passive resistance may be 
used (Chang 2001: 157; Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey 1988: 122 quoted in Chang 
2001: 158). Chinese treat communication as a way of reaffirming the 
communicator as a member of society and of maintaining existing relationships, 
social harmony and status credentials (ref. liamo above) (Chang 2001: 158). 
However, the emphasis on harmony has certain limits. There is a tendency 
to “cleverly craft messages to communicate competition and frustration, while 
maintaining a front of harmonious relationship”, and unkind messages are often 
communicated under a guise of harmony or friendly gestures. It is a well know 
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strategy in traditional Chinese politics to use clever language, employing metaphor, 
analogy, irony and other rhetorical devices to utter criticism (Chang 2001: 159). 
The desire to maintain social harmony provides other, less direct ways, of 
designing communication strategies that can be highly manipulative and intended 
for personal benefit even though they appear not to be at a surface level (Chang 
2001: 174). Non-contention is often used to maintain balance and manage 
conflicts so as not to disrupt harmony and threaten face. Moreover, deception of 
out-group members is considered acceptable and strategically wise as lying is not 
considered morally wrong in such relationships (Lu 2002: 16-17).  
In the case of adversarial relations, especially if trust is lacking, the Chinese 
will make use of traditional stratagems as a form of psychological wresteling 
(Ghauri and Fang 1999: 12-15). These are carefully devised tactics or strategies to 
deal with various kinds of situations in order to gain a psychological and material 
advantage over one’s adversary. Most are found in the classical work in Chinese 
strategic thinking “Art of War” by Sun Tzu - a 6th century BC general and military 
strategist. The stratagems include such behaviour as deception, attacking the 
opponent’s vulnerabilities, espionage, manipulating friendship and hospitality, 
playing the competitors against each other, benchmarking and flexibility (Ghauri 
and Fang 1999: 12-15). These stratagems differ from traditional Western thinking 
on strategy, captured in Clausewitz’ On War. Western strategy often involves 
“absolute force” whereas the Chinese assert superiority using human wisdom, 
preferably without fighting (Ghauri and Fang 1999: 12).  
4.4 Foreign policy - history and rhetoric 
The following discussion of Chinese foreign policy behaviour relates to all actors 
as representatives of a system rather than as individual actors. This is meaningful 
because the party-state symbiosis between the CCP and the PRC makes 
distinctions meaningless. The state’s ideological apparatus ensures that political 
communication is uniform throughout the nation, either by force or by cultivation 
of consensus behaviour (Qui 2000: 251). The following is a summary of past 
events that have contributed to the current state of the Chinese ethos  
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4.4.1 The Mao era 
On its establishment in 1949 and until the end of the Mao era between 1976 and 
1978, the PRC was a revolutionary state, applying a highly articulate and 
systematic Communist ideology to foreign policy. That is, continuous revolution, 
both internally and externally, was the state’s first priority and all non-communist 
countries were regarded as enemies (Qui 2000: 256; Bert 2003: 110). China 
regarded itself as an outsider trying to change the international status quo within 
the international community (Zhao 1996: 40-41; Zhao 2004 b: 7). The country 
was diplomatically isolated after it failed to gain control over Taiwan immediately 
after the communist victory on the mainland in 1949. Instead, Taiwan established 
itself as the Republic of China (ROC), gaining international recognition as the 
legitimate Chinese government and China’s seat in the UN. Since then, Taiwan’s 
status has been a sensitive issue in PRC foreign policy, even after the majority of 
the international community had switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC 
during the 1970s (Zhao 1996: 47). In a hostile international environment, the PRC 
attempted to prevent threats to the regime by using aggressive rhetoric and 
frequent use of force as diplomatic deterrence to protect its security (Zhao 1996: 
49). In fact, China was second only to the United States in the use of force, 
attaining the highest average level of hostility and violence in its disputes (Bert 
2003: 109). However, China also had a reputation for bluffing. In the 1950s, 
Chinese diplomacy was discredited by a series of unfulfilled threats and self-
imposed deadlines for the “liberation” of Taiwan that were not met (Sartori 2005: 
33-36).  
In response to its failure on the diplomatic front, Beijing presented a new 
line of policy in 1954 which reduced the ideological content of the PRC’s foreign 
policy. The five principles of peaceful coexistence, 1) mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, 2) mutual non-aggression, 3) non-interference in internal 
affairs, 4) equality and mutual benefit, and 5) peaceful coexistence are still official 
policy (Bert 2003: 110, Wu 2004: 61).  At the time, these overlapping principles 
and the softer approach to foreign policy was an attempt to appeal both to a 
broad range of third world countries and justify continued support for insurgent 
movements in Southeast Asia (Bert 2003: 110; Wu 2004: 61). The application of 
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the principles to specific issues has been difficult, and Beijing has often 
pragmatically opted to compromise principles for a more realistic approach which 
serves Chinese interests (Wu 2004: 62).  
The principles also reflect China’s intense concern over sovereignty. 
Beijing’s concept of sovereignty includes the moral values of justice, equality and 
mutual respect. Any perceived violations of these principles are identified as 
threats to the country’s sovereignty (Wang 2002: 218).  This concern over 
sovereignty is driven by three factors. First, during what is referred to as the 
‘century of humiliation’, from the opium wars in 1839 to the end of Japanese 
occupation in 1945, “China suffered from political, economic, and military 
aggression by the West”. The “victim” discourse inspired by this historical period 
has been an important frame for Chinese interactions with the West (Gries 2005: 
46-47; Wu 2004: 59). It reflects a fear of losing face - giving rise to a “sour grapes” 
mentality and an official rhetoric of pretending not to want what they could not 
have (Gries 2005: 62). Second, China claims to differ from Western notions of 
state building in its unique value system supporting a distinctive political and legal 
system. This claim rests on China’s claim to status as a developing socialist state 
and Lee Kwan-Yew’s Confucian-inspired ‘Asian values’ (Wu 2004: 59-60; 
Stockman 2000: 91). As a result, China tends to invoke the principle of 
sacrosanctity when referring to its sovereignty. Third, some disputed territories are 
central to Chinese domestic politics as Beijing has invested significant prestige in 
conflict outcomes in these areas. The central government fears for its territorial 
integrity and stability of the regime if Tibet, Xinjiand or Taiwan attain any 
semblance of independence, or there is too much foreign interference in the 
management of these territories (Wu 2004: 59-60; Bert 2003: 54). China’s lack of 
engagement in international organizations until the mid 1990s reflects this concern 
over sovereignty. Such organizations were regarded as vehicles of Western 
imperialism until the attitude gradually eased after China’s entry into the UN in 
1971 (Zhao 1996: 57-58). 
During the revolutionary period, a combination of ideological and 
traditional thinking formed the foundation of Maoist foreign policy. Mao was 
deeply influenced by ancient principles of diplomacy and ideas of principled and 
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flexible behaviour. Diplomatically, Mao and China’s top military commanders 
favoured the stratagem of ‘negotiating with faraway countries while fighting those 
that are near’. This is said to be the rationale for first proposing rapprochement 
with the US after the Sino-Soviet border clash in 1969 (Zhao 1996: 116-117). 
Other patterns of behaviour evident in foreign policy draw on both Marxist and 
traditional Chinese thinking rhetorically and strategically, and Western values for 
technical and practical purposes (Zhou 1996: 118). The Marxist and traditional 
Chinese thinking is evident in Mao’s tendency to use bombastic political slogans, 
clichés, and quotations and articulated opposition to the superpowers in favour of 
close relations with developing countries. While politically the language and 
arguments were Marxist-inspired, the strategic use of language to affect thinking is 
based on the Confucian ideas of the power of naming1. The naming process aims 
at prescribing and advocating a vision of social reality to correct one’s way of 
thinking and style of work (Lu 2000: 10-11; Medeiros and Fravel 2004: 389).   
4.4.2 Reform period  
The rapprochement between the US and China initiated the transformation of 
China into a post-revolutionary state. As a post-revolutionary state, China set 
economic development as its main priority, thereby also opening up for pressure 
from the public (Zhao 1996: 41). The Sino-Soviet split finalized in 1968 had 
generated a strategic opportunity enabling the PRC to become a strategic ally for 
the US in efforts to isolate the Soviet Union (Zhao 1996: 128; Kissinger 1994: 
491; Dittmer 2004: 208). The internal political transformation was marked by the 
death of Mao in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping’s emergence as the new top leader in 
1978. He and his followers initiated a series of fundamental changes in both 
principle and substance (Liu 2004: 11). Full diplomatic recognition from the US in 
1979, opened the door for other internal and external developments (Zhao 2004 
b: 15). It  
 Deng era politics had three main ambitions. China was to ‘oppose 
hegemonism’ and ‘preserve world peace’, work toward unification with Taiwan 
and promote modernization. Under modernization, political reform also 
                                                 
1 Ref. “the Analects of Confucius”, chapter 13. 3 
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transformed foreign policy making, making it more open to the international 
community (Zhao 1996: 51). The ‘open door’ policy required a rhetorical 
turnaround without being seen to reverse Communist ideology. Deng also 
employed the Confucian principle of naming, devising the contemporary Chinese 
oxymoron of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. This was an attempt to 
legitimize and promote economic reform without being seen to reverse 
Communist ideology. In order to manage this Deng turned to what is widely 
know as “building socialism with Chinese characteristics” – a broad and 
ambiguous phrase that conceals as much as it reveals (Qui 2000: 252). To Western 
eyes it appears to be a euphemism for economic flexibility, but such naming 
processes were an essential part of the reform process (Lu 2000: 11). This 
reinterpretation of Mao opened up for crucial rhetorical space for the next 
decades and the revival of common sense after the heady policies under Mao (Qui 
2000: 253-254). 
However, in foreign policy rhetoric Beijing retained many of the axiomatic 
responses from earlier decades. They frequently employed face-saving strategies 
know as psychological emphasis. One such strategy is not to argue against a given 
charge but to counterattack, ignore and pose new threats on the basis of a careful 
analysis of the opponents’ weaknesses and motives. For example, after the 
Tiananmen Square crisis Beijing faced charges of human rights abuses and threats 
to China’s ‘Most Favored Nation’ status (MFN) with the US. The Chinese 
response was counter-charges of interference with sovereignty and threats of 
economic loss if MFN was revoked. Another strategy is to “disengage” the 
argument. Here, an actor chooses to direct the audience’s attention away from the 
major premise set up by the opponent and instead focus on different variables and 
situations. This is seen in China’s response to repeated US charges of human 
rights violations, whereby Beijing charges the US of racial discrimination (Lu 
2000: 11-12). 
Since 1989 PRC leaders have continued to use public occasions for 
posturing, establishing trust and seeking substantial results only through private 
channels. In public, the relationship between the speaker and the audience is more 
important than verbal expression (Lu 2002: 12). Saving face remained important 
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enough for Beijing to risk serious diplomatic rows with Washington after the 1999 
Belgrade embassy bombing, and the 2001 spy plane incident (Gries 2005; BBC 
News 2001: 07/03). Their uncompromising stance on issues regarding Taiwan and 
the South China Sea, military modernization and the regionally disruptive 
economic behaviour generated a lot of ill will in the region (Shambaugh 2005: :32). 
However, Beijing’s rhetoric has changed substantially over time. Wang’s (2005) 
analysis of translated government publications documents designed to publicize 
and explain to the international community China’s position documents this 
(Wang 2005: 74). He found that, over time, the projected images of China as 
peace-loving, a victim, socialist, revolutionary, antihegemonic, developing, major 
power, cooperator and autonomous fluctuated. The image of China as peace-
loving peaked around 1987, but was rising again in 1999. The victim discourse 
along with the socialist, revolutionary and autonomy discourses have virtually 
disappeared, declining rapidly in use after rapprochement in 1971. The emphases 
on China as a major power and antihegemonic force have fluctuated heavily but 
were both declining in 1999. On the other hand, the emphasis on cooperation had 
increased dramatically since 1989, featuring above all other discourses in terms of 
frequency in 1999 (Wang 2005: 78).  
4.4.3 Recent development - The rise and fall of ‘Peaceful Rise’ 
Today, the two main pillars of Chinese foreign policy thinking are independence and 
peace (Cheng and Wankun 2004: 184). The five principles of peaceful coexistence from 
1954 are still in place as a guiding doctrine, and ideology still plays an 
indispensable role in political institutions (Lin 2003: 39; Wu 2004: 61). The 
principles build on traditional Chinese thinking - dreaming of a world in universal 
harmony - the century of humiliation, and the legacy of Marxist-Leninist and 
Maoist thinking (Wu 2004: 61). China today sees itself as the world’s largest 
developing nation. As such it takes on the role of patron and spokesman for other 
developing nations. It makes a point of stating that China will always side with the 
developing countries and never seek hegemony or superpower status (Wu 2004: 
61).       
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However, principle has gradually given way to pragmatism in more areas. Before 
1997, China showed itself as an irredentist, revisionist rising power, particularly in 
relation to Taiwan (Goldstein 2003: 83). But Beijing has come to realize that a 
confrontational relationship with the US would complicate the PRC’s ability to 
benefit from participating in the international economy, and force it to forfeit 
linkages established by partnership with the US More seriously, Beijing could risk 
being cast as the unequivocal adversary of an American military that 
unquestionably outclasses the PLA (Goldstein 2005: 159). In 1997, leaders in 
Beijing began to search for ways to portray China’s growth as unthreatening. They 
made this change only reluctantly because they were, and still are to some extent, 
unwilling to openly acknowledge that China is rising to great power status (Shih 
2005: 755). The change in approach is seen in three fundamental transformations 
in foreign policy. 
First, China now actively embraces multilateralism. The country more 
readily accepts policies that help redefine China as a responsible and reliable 
international actor. The aim of this policy direction is to combat China’s image as 
an untrustworthy international player and counter potential threats. One move 
that is typical of the change in approach is the self-restraint China showed during 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when Beijing stuck to its assurances that it would 
not devalue the yuan to maintain the competitiveness of Chinese exports. 
Declining exports hurt the national economic growth in the midst of a painful 
domestic reform period, but was tolerated in expectation of significant 
international political dividends (Goldstein 2003: 73-74). 
Second, Beijing has sought to establish and cultivate “strategic 
partnerships” with great powers. This policy is aimed at reducing “the likelihood 
that others would unite to prevent China’s slow but steady rise to the ranks of 
great power” because its underscores “the opportunity cost of working against it”, 
binding their interests to China’s (Goldstein 2003: 72, 74). Such an approach 
avoids direct confrontation with the US as far as possible and allows China to 
eschew traditional ally and adversary models (Goldstein 2003: 74-75). 
Third, the making of foreign policy has changed significantly. 
Diplomatically, China has become a much more capable and adept player, 
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bringing more to cooperative efforts than before (Medeiros and Fravel 2004: 388).  
However, there is also mounting evidence that Beijing leaders are under increasing 
social pressure when making policies (Hao 2005: 3). Foreign policy making today 
is far more institutionalized, professionalized and decentralized, depending much 
less on any individual leader. Internal think tanks and specialists from outside the 
government often serve as consultants who travel abroad, interact with 
international experts in their field, and sensitize China’s leaders to international 
trends as well as present them with a range of policy options (Medeiros and Fravel 
2004: 393; Hao 2005: 7; Lu 2005: 111). The most radical change in foreign policy 
practice has been the efforts to publicize and promote policies. The trend began 
in the mid 1990s with the publication of new white papers on controversial policy 
topics, so as to articulate and defend Beijing’s positions. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs provides wide access to its publications via its website (Medeirios and 
Fravel 2004: 394-395; Lu 2005: 112-113).  
The above re-conceptualization for foreign policy is evident in foreign 
policy promotion efforts. American China observers and policy-makers have long 
hoped for a “peaceful evolution” in China. However, foreign proposals for Beijing 
to adopt ‘peace’ as official policy was originally rejected by as “just a coup d’etat 
by other means” coming from capitalist countries. This concept has now been 
appropriated by the Chinese authorities and rephrased in Chinese terminology as 
“peacefully keeping pace with the times”, “Peaceful Rise” and “peace, cooperation 
and development” (Wan 2005: 296, n48 303). The “peaceful rise” policy was 
launched in November 2003, by academic advisor Zheng Bijian as new the model 
for Chinese foreign policy. The essence of this idea was that China would rely 
mainly on its own strength in its rise to great power status, but that it needed a 
peaceful international environment to accomplish the task of lifting its enormous 
population out of a condition of underdevelopment. Furthermore, China would 
rise without destabilizing the international or regional order (Suettinger 2004: 2). 
The idea did not come from Zheng alone, but had been circulating among 
academics and think tanks for some time. But it was only after Zheng led a 
delegation of scholars to the United States in 2002 in an effort to find ways to 
alleviate foreign concerns for China’ rise and to seek cooperation with the West 
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that it became official. During the trip it became clear that in US circles, there 
were two prevailing views of China’s future that needed to be confronted. Either 
China was expected to rise rapidly and challenge US power and security, or, it 
might collapse as a failed state. The project received 2 million Yuan in 
sponsorship – an unheard-of amount in Chinese social science research – and was 
promptly approved by Hu Jintao. (Suettinger 2004: 3; Wan 2005: n49 303). The 
term “peaceful rise” was used by premier Wen Jiabao, President Hu Jintao and 
others, including the state news agency Xinhua and party newspaper People’s 
Daily, during the latter part of 2003 and early 2004. Chinese embassy websites also 
featured the theme prominently (Suettinger 2004: 6, Wan 2005: n49 303).  
However, by April 2004 Hu Jintao had dropped the phrase in favour of 
“peace and development” for reasons unknown (Suettinger 2004: 6). China Daily, 
People’s Daily and Xinhua have also exchanged it for “peace and development”. 
Suettinger (2004) speculates that the term was subject to an internal power 
struggle in the Politburo Standing Committee with Jiang Zemin and his 
supporters on one side and Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and their supporters on the 
other. However, I would also add that in the years after Zheng’s research trip, 
there has been a marked change in the global perception of China. The view that 
something would go amiss and China would collapse as a failed state is now rarely 
heard. Recognition of the fact that the country is now a major global player 
politically and economically has provoked “an intense debate among national 
policy elites, including China’s” (Jacques 2005). I would agree with Suettinger that 
the change in rhetoric reflects internal debates. However, I would like to add that 
the change of language may reflect the change in outside perceptions seen in the 
last two to three years. “Rise” certainly has different connotations from 
“cooperation” and “development”. The word “rise” might even be said to 
aggravate the suspicions outlined in chapter 3.  
“Peaceful rise” has proved a powerful concept and though the exact phrase 
is no longer used by the Chinese authorities, it lingers is Western discourse on 
China (BBC 2005: 11/1; China Daily 2005: 14 Nov; Washington Post 2005: A18; 
Pentagon 2005: 4).  
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5. Constructing a new “China” 
“When names are not used properly, language will not be used effectively; when language is not used effectively, 
matters will not be taken care of…the application of laws and punishments will not be on the mark ….Thus, 
when the exemplary person (junzi) puts a name to something, it can certainly be spoken, and when spoken it can 
certainly be acted upon. There is nothing careless in the attitude of the exemplary person toward what is said” 
On the art of naming, the Analects of Confucius, chapter 13. 3 
 
In this chapter I discuss the characteristics of recent Chinese diplomatic self-
presentation as a part of ethos construction and facework on the international 
arena. To this end I use Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis. As stated in 
chapter 3, there are several competing discourses challenging China’s own 
discourse about the country’s future and role in affairs world. The issue is 
politically salient, and has been so for some years, yet China’s own discourse on 
the subject is a relatively unexplored area within China studies. Scholarly work on 
China’s foreign relations has frequently addressed the topic of perception (and 
misperception), yielding insights into the formation of China’s perceptions of 
others, and other’s perceptions of China, as well as the impact of mutual 
perceptions (Wang 2005: 98 n5). However, there is knowledge gap concerning 
China’s national ethos construction. Of all the sources reviewed for this study, 
only one, Wang (2005), systematically addresses this topic.  
The following analysis is an extended examination of Beijing’s attempt to 
improve the condition of its ethos. China’s ethos problem is twofold. First, it has 
a past blemished with aggressive behaviour and rhetoric, uncooperative behaviour 
and unfulfilled threats and promises, giving Chinese diplomacy a lack of credibility 
and the country an unsavoury image to some states. Second, China’s growing 
clout both regionally and globally based on its fast-growing economy and rapidly 
expanding network of associates, has Western powers, the US especially, treating 
China with apprehension. The country is thus in the position of trying to establish 
a new, more credible ethos while relying on that same ethos to influence the 
perceptions and policies of other states. The texts I have chosen are prominent 
and representative examples of how Beijing wrestles with this Catch 22. 
Two of my texts were originally classified as public speeches and only one 
is published in article form only. However, I argue that all the texts may be 
analysed as written texts rather than as speeches because of they way they are 
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consumed. As the speeches were originally delivered in Chinese (Mandarin) the 
vast majority of the foreign audience for whom the speeches were intended would 
consume it as a written text in translated form. I argue that the authors take this 
into account when producing the text. Hu Jintao’s speech is published in written 
form on both the UN website and the Foreign Ministry’s website. The Foreign 
Minister’s speech is published on numerous Chinese embassy and consulate 
websites, the Foreign Ministry’s own website and was published as an article in the 
Chinese Journal of International Law. It is possible that it appears even more 
places. Thus, I study all the texts as if they were written texts. This 
recontextualization has an impact on genre classification because I leave out 
considerations of the particulars of oral presentations such as voice inflection, 
variations in speed and other non-verbal gestures. The particularity of analyzing 
written text is that when reading a written text we have time to consider the 
arguments carefully and can to a certain extent reflect on them independent of the 
author (Kjeldsen 2004: 60) 
 
As my starting point I use Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional concept of 
discourse – consisting of text, discourse practice and social practices. Important 
aspects of social practice which function as a backdrop for the analysis of 
discourse practice and text understanding are presented in chapters 3 and 4. In the 
following analysis, I first introduce recent developments in foreign policy making. 
Then I consider genre, kairos and interdiscursivity as parts of discourse practice. 
Third, I discuss intertextuality and the use of rhetorical devices and politeness 
practices as aspects of text. Finally, I analyse the significance of these practices to 
ethos building.   
  
The sources I have selected for this analysis are all from high-level officials 
representing different aspects of the Chinese Communist leadership as it is today. 
I do not regard them as individual actors but as representatives of different 
aspects of a system that has undergone significant change, giving rise to tension 
between old and new approaches to policy. My three sources show the types of 
practices that currently coexist – however uneasily - within the communist party. 
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In the past three to five years, Chinese political institutions have undergone 
significant change. 
First, the changes that have taken place in the Chinese leadership since 2002 have 
altered the face of the Party. In 2002-2003 the top leadership underwent an 
incomplete yet significant transition to the fourth generation of leaders. Hu Jintao 
was appointed General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party at the 16th 
session of the Central Committee in November 2002. He was then appointed 
President of China at the 10th National People’s Congress the following March. Li 
Zhaoxing became Minister of Foreign Affairs at the same Congress (Liu 2004: 
11). This new generation of Chinese communist leaders have a background that 
differs greatly from previous generations. Whereas Mao, Deng, and Jiang all had 
strong ties to the military and an active revolutionary record, the new generation 
are primarily technocrats and bureaucrats. They have been technically trained, and 
that background has influenced their approach to decision–making. Technocrats 
are trained to be problem-solvers, not ideologues, and they tend to steer away 
from “isms”. As problem solvers in an increasingly complex environment, the 
fourth generation leaders have turned to experts, such as Zheng Bijian, and 
research institutions like the China Reform Forum to make policies and hammer 
out consensus. The decision-making process has thus been enlarged to include 
additional actors such as non-party academic policy think tanks. However, it must 
be mentioned that the transition to the fourth generation leadership is not 
complete or unencumbered. Former President Jiang Zemin still enjoys power and 
influence, and the PLA continues to exert pressure on military and foreign policy. 
This friction within the party organs is sometimes evident in the choice of rhetoric 
such as illustrated by the “peaceful rise” rhetoric discussed in chapter 4 (Fewsmith 
2001: 83-84). 
The new officials were on a diplomatic offensive during most of 2005 
continuing into 2006. The president has retained a high profile, giving speeches in 
multilateral organs like the UN and APEC as well as going on a number of highly 
publicized diplomatic visits to Europe, the US, Asia and Africa. President Hu has 
especially sought to further China’s long-standing strategy of befriending its 
immediate neighbours to ensure they do not seek closer relations with the US 
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(BBC New 2005: 1/11; BBC New 2005: 11/7; BBC New 2006: 4/19; BBC News 
2006: 4/24). Li has addressed ASEAN and the UN while Zheng has addressed the 
Centre for European Reform (Li 2005 c, d; Zheng 2005; Wen 2005)   
Second, the making of foreign policy and the Foreign Ministry itself 
have transformed dramatically. The Ministry has gone from being one of the 
most “mysterious and cloistered” government departments to a model of 
openness and interaction with the public in Chinese politics. It was the PRC 
first governmental department to go online, and it has thrown considerable 
energy into achieving the image as well as the result of “public diplomacy” (Lu 
2005: 111-113). The website is designed as a one-stop-shop for information on 
Chinese foreign affairs and diplomatic activities. The site is available in 
English, French, Russian, Spanish and Arabic in addition to Chinese. Much of 
my data, speeches and policy statements especially, come from this website or 
affiliated websites such as embassy homepages (fmprc.gov.cn)   
5.2 Discourse practice 
As far as discussions of discursive practice is concerned, I am interested in the 
interdiscursive properties of the texts and the significance of this and kairos for 
genre construction. I argue that the diverse social practices on which Beijing 
draws to produce the texts have been highly influential in shaping current Chinese 
foreign policy discourse. Many of the central concepts and official policies of the 
Chinese state strongly reflect the intertextual chains of which they are a part. The 
texts, of course, differ in their interdiscursive properties. This can largely be 
attributed to considerations of kairos. The results are three different genres which 
shed light on Beijing’s ethos building efforts. First I discuss factors which 
contribute to determining genre. Second, I discuss particular inderdiscursive 
qualities of the texts, the norms or assumptions on which they rely and what other 
genres they draw on.    
First, the texts are delivered by three very different actors who clearly have 
a similar agenda, but deliver the message in significantly different ways. President 
Hu Jintao is the highest ranking official in the sample. He now holds the highest 
authority in all three branches of power – party, state and military – since taking 
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over as head of the army after Jiang in September 2004. He was a largely unknown 
quantity when he emerged from obscurity in the Politburo in 2002. His moves 
have been followed closely. So far, analysts argue that politically he is a liberal 
reformer at home, but a relatively inexperienced strategist abroad. His foreign 
policy choices, such as adopting the phrase “peaceful rise” to describe China’s role 
in world politics, have met with opposition at home, presumably from Jiang and 
the military, and have sometimes been short-lived venture (Gompert et al 2005: 
18). Li Cheng, professor of government at Hamilton College in the United States, 
says Mr Hu perceives his mandate as President of the PRC to be “to save the 
Chinese Communist Party and to enhance China’s influence and power in the 
ever-changing international environment” (Luard 2005). However, Hu has made it 
clear that he has no intention of going as far as countenancing Western-style 
political reform. He has also moved slowly so as to not antagonize his predecessor 
Jiang, who remains an influential figure (BBC News: profile Hu Jintao) 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Li Zhaoxing, is a professional diplomat 
who has served as Chinese ambassador to the United Nations and the United 
States (Liu 2004: 11). The appointment of Li emphasizes the absolute 
predominance of relations with the US over any of China’s other foreign policy 
issues. He has a track record as a stanch polemicist, but this does not necessarily 
indicate he will front a more acquiescent Chinese foreign policy (Gompert et al 
2005: 18).  
Zheng Bijian is a close associate of President Hu Jintao and the mind 
behind the “peaceful rise” paradigm from 2003-2004 (Yardley 2005). He 
represents the recent tendency to draw on academic expertise in policy-making 
referred to above. Currently, he is Chairman of the China Reform Forum (CIRD), 
a nongovernmental and nonprofit academic organization that provides research 
on, and analysis of domestic, international and development issues related to 
China. Previously, Zheng held the position of Executive Vice President of the 
Party School of the CPC Central Committee of the Communist Party (CPC) and 
is still on its academic committee. Foreign Affairs write about Zheng that he has 
“drafted key reports for five Chinese national party congresses and held senior 
posts in academic and party organizations in China” (Zheng 2005: 18). 
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I interpret the underlying social purpose of the selected texts to be similar, 
differing only in terms of the intended audience and the medium through which 
they were published. I selected the texts for this very reason. Therefore, any 
discussion of the social purpose of the texts as a part of the discussion of genre 
must include elements of both the expected content, the medium and the when 
and where of publication. The text that is most explicit in its social purpose and 
where this purpose and expected content are intertwined with the ‘when’ and 
‘where’ of presentation is Hu Jintao’s piece. His text was delivered at the 2005 
summit held for the 60th anniversary of the United Nations - the largest-ever 
gathering of world leaders, bringing together more than 150 heads of state and 
government (BBC News 2005: 17/09). Thus, the speech has a clear 
commemorative function, praising “the beautiful ideal of the international 
community” and recounting how “the United nations has gone through all kinds 
of tests and traversed an extraordinary course”, as did the other speakers. 
However, it also appears to have had two more agendas, the second of which 
would benefit from the record-sized audience of top world leaders.  
The first agenda is again suggested by the occasion, because the purpose of 
the UN summit was the negotiation of a plan for a long-anticipated reform of the 
UN. It was hyped as “an opportunity to reshape the world body for the challenges 
of the 21st Century” (BBC News 2005: 17/09) At the end of the three-day 
summit, during which most of the delegates addressed the issue of UN reform 
during the high-level plenary session on 15 September, a 35-page document 
provided the authorization to set up new commissions and stake out a new course 
for the UN. The purpose of the UN summit speeches, as Li later summed it up, 
was to express China’s view on a number of issues thereby articulating China’s 
official policy priorities in the UN. The foreign minister said the views and 
proposals were well-reflected in the final reform document (Li 2005 a: 18/09). 
These proposals included greater UN commitment to the question of 
development… and increased the representation of the developing countries…to 
participate in the Security Council.”  
The second agenda is related to Beijing’s efforts to build ethos via 
diplomatic activities abroad. Hu’s attendance at the UN summit was part of a 
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longish diplomatic trip during which Hu visited Canada and Mexico. The foreign 
minister, who attended the UN summit with the President, said the purpose of the 
trip was to address the “targets of strengthening dialogues, enhancing mutual 
trust, promoting cooperation and achieving common development” (Li 2005 a: 
18/09). The purpose of the particular text I have selected was to “expound the 
position of the Chinese government on major international issues, promote the 
establishment of new equitable and rational international political and economic 
order and safeguard the legitimate interests and rights of developing nations” (Li 
2005 a: 18/9). In addition, Hu attended bilateral meetings with US President 
Bush, Russian President Putin, Indian Prime Minister Singh and eight other 
leaders from smaller states around the world. As was the purpose of the trip, “Hu 
systematically introduced the economic and social development scenario of China 
and stressed that China is still a developing nation and developing the economy 
and improving the quality of people lives is still the central task of China” (Li 2005 
a: 18/09).  
No such clear purpose is stated for Li Zhaoxing’s own text. It is published 
in a range of places, usually with the date 22 August, 2005, given as the original 
publication date. The text appears on a number of embassy and consulate 
websites. It is also referred to by government newspaper China Daily as an 
important article alongside Hu’s UN speech and appears as an opinion article in 
China Daily (He 2005: 24/11; Li 2005 b). It appears in the Chinese Journal of 
International Law, an “independent peer reviewed research journal edited 
primarily by scholars from mainland China” published by Oxford Journals (Li 
2005 b). The journal declares that it has taken the text unedited from the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry’s website. China Daily writes of both Hu and Li’s texts that they 
have “drawn up a clear diplomatic roadmap for the country and made clear to the 
whole world that China has embraced a peaceful diplomatic ideology” (He 2005). 
In terms of content the texts are remarkably similar both in terms of choice 
of theme and words. As official representations of the foreign policy of a state, 
especially an authoritarian state that controls its media and internal discourse as 
tightly as does the PRC, it is not strange that their messages should be roughly the 
same. Li’s and Hu’s texts in particular show a striking resemblance. The Foreign 
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Ministry’s website data on the minister’s diplomatic activity also shows that, 
during the autumn of 2005, the minister’s activities shadowed those of President 
Hu. They travel together and attend meetings with their respective counterparts, 
as was the case with the above mentioned trip to the UN, Canada and Mexico. 
Some words and phrases appear in both speeches and appear again in government 
news reports. For example, Hu’s statement “unswervingly follow the road of 
peaceful development” appears as the headline of a People’s Daily article 
(People’s Daily 2005: 2/09).  
Zheng Bijian’s text undoubtedly has a similar social purpose as the two 
texts previously mentioned, albeit directed at a different audience. He indicates as 
much in the introduction when he says “Correctly understanding China’s 
achievements and its path towards greater development is crucial”. The kairos also 
suggests this as the Foreign Affairs’ website declares that the journal is “the forum 
of choice for the most important new ideas, analysis, and debate on the most 
significant issues in the world” and that “articles published in Foreign Affairs shape 
the political dialogue for months and years to come” (www.foreingaffairs.org). 
The council responsible for its publication consists of past and present US 
“Presidents, Secretaries of State, Defence and Treasury, other senior US 
government officials, renowned scholars, and major leaders of business, media, 
human rights, and other non-governmental groups”(www.foreignaffairs.org). I 
interpret the social purpose of the article to be generating the “correct 
understanding” of the Chinese ethos among the council members who also 
represent the journal’s readership. 
 
I expect the content of each text to correspond to China’s official foreign policy, 
as it is laid out in the Foreign Ministry’s brief policy statements. The titles include 
“Independent foreign policy of peace”, “China’s view on Development”, “China’s 
view of Multipolarisation”, “China’s view of South-South Cooperation”, and 
“Establishing a New International Economic Order” (fmprc.gov.cn/eng). These 
policies are neatly summarized in Hu and Li’s titles: “Building Towards a 
Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity” (Hu 2005) and 
“Peace, Development and Cooperation – Banner for China’s Diplomacy in the 
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New Era” (Li 2005 b). Zheng’s title “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power 
status” sums up his position but not the content, though his themes are all drawn 
from the same foreign policy agenda as the other two, but articulated with 
different words. A number of speeches produced by the same authors as well as 
Premier Wen Jiabao throughout 2005 appear as rewritings of these titles. For 
example, Hu’s speech from the APEC CEO summit in October 2005 was called 
“An Open Mind for Win-Win Cooperation”, Wen Jiabao’s speech from the First 
East Asia Summit in December 2005 reads “Be open and Inclusive and Achieve 
Mutual Benefit and Common Progress”. 
The individual outlets for the texts have their own institutional settings that 
influence the genre of the texts. The outlets constitute the selection of the 
appropriate kairos. First, international organisations, like the UN, have developed 
their own organisational culture which affects member behaviour (Hofstede and 
Hofstede 2005: 340). In the UN, it is well-established diplomatic practice among 
members to not publicly attack specific member states (Burkeman 2006). The UN 
is also the ultimate legitimizer of actions on behalf of world peace (Hofstede and 
Hofstede 2005: 205). It is in a special position to allow its members to enhance 
their ability to influence, persuade and attract in a way that does not rely on 
threats and promises - using what Joseph Nye called ‘soft power’ (Nye 2004: 6,10; 
Wallander, Haftendorn and Keohane 1999: 10). In addition, the UN and its 
institutional rules are based on the liberal and democratic nature of the British and 
American economic system where balancing using soft power is an important 
feature of institutional practice (Nye 2004: 10). Finally, the UN is currently 
undergoing a controversial reform process. The direction of this process is spelled 
out in a 35-page document resulting from negotiations which took place during 
the 60th session of the UN (Black 2005).  
Second, as stated above, Li’s article appears several places and is 
continuously available on the Foreign Ministry’s websites as a part of the 
information material they offer visitors. The Foreign Ministry and various 
affiliated websites of its overseas stations are likely to be subject to the Party’s 
control and thus adher closely to government policy. At the same time, it is worth 
mentioning that the Foreign Ministry have resisted the new policy turn. Especially 
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Zheng’s concept of “a peaceful rise” was perceived as “a self-indulgent pipe 
dream” (Xiang 2006) 
Third, Zheng Bijian’s article appeared in a special issue of the US based 
journal Foreign Affairs for September/October 2005. His short article opens the 
section on China. I argue that the social purpose of the article relates to the 
journal’s self-proclaimed ability to “shape the political dialogue for months and 
years to come” (www.foreignaffaris.com). Publishing the article in this prestigious 
academic forum is noteworthy because its publications tend to have a significant 
impact on American policy. As Encyclopædia Britannica (2006: online) notes 
“Ideas put forward in this journal, if well received by the Foreign Affairs 
community, often reappeared later as U.S. government policy or legislation”. It is 
a type of testing ground for policies.  
  
The texts rely on a mix of genres to interpellate the reader. Hu’s text is addressed 
to the other statesmen attending the meeting as well as observers of the UN. Like 
other speeches he interpellates the receiver as one of “us”, using the third person 
pronoun frequently and speaking of ideals and principles. The speaker is a central 
component of the text and Hu uses the first person singular “I” and refers to “my 
views”, which is uncharacteristic of Chinese rhetorical style. Like other speakers, 
Hu addresses the UN’s achievements and ideals and UN reform. However, the 
text differs from the others in that it is longer, avoid specific examples, instead 
speaking of moral principles, frequently uses the phrase “we should”, and makes 
no specific reference to the speaker’s origin until a short note at the very end of 
the text. With its formal official style, moralizing tone, and occasionally bombastic 
statements like “amid stupendous changes around the world and vicissitudes in 
the international arena, the United Nations has gone through all kinds of tests and 
traversed an extraordinary course”, Hu’s text is a mix of Western and Chinese 
genres. On the one hand, the personal style and appeal to the ideals of the 
international community, mentioning human rights and praise of democracy, I 
would argue, draws on the same norms on which the UN was founded and which 
– based on causal reading of speeches - it is common for other speakers to refer. 
On the other hand, the lack of references to specific events, the use of the word 
“harmony” and other cultural key-word, moralizing modalities such as “we 
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should”, and frequent indirect references to the five principles of peaceful 
coexistence are features associated with CCP rhetoric and Chinese cultural 
practices as discussed in chapter 4. In addition, his use of pathos differs from that 
of other leaders. Hu’s opening statement:  
 
“At this solemn and important moment, national leaders and representatives 
from around the world are gathered here to commemorate the 60th 
anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, renewing our 
commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and 
expressing our determination to safeguard world peace and promote 
common development”  
 
Contrast this with US President Bush’s opening statement “We meet at a time of 
great challenge for America and the World. At this moment, men and women 
along my country’s Gulf Coast are recovering from one of the worst natural 
disasters in American history” (Bush 2005). Hu tends to appeal more to the 
listener’s sense of justice and moral fibre when he repeats the phrase “we should” 
when referring to conflict settlement, sovereignty, antiterrorism, disarmament,  
and so on. While Bush uses graphic and vivid pathos, Hu refers to abstract 
concepts with positive or negative connotations. He even says “We should 
actively promote and protect human rights”. In one sentence he uses almost all of 
his abstract concepts: 
  
“We must abandon the Cold-War mentality, cultivate a new security 
concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and 
cooperation, and build a fair and effective collective security 
mechanism aimed at jointly preventing war and conflict and safeguard 
world peace”.  
 
Linguistic imagery so central to Bush’s rhetoric and other UN speeches is almost 
absent in Hu’s text. Except for occasional statements like “save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war”, his imagery tends to rely on the use of 
cultural keywords, especially “harmony”, “trust” and “peace” used in topos 
constructions of pathos, primarily using cause and effect logic. For example, “[We 
should] uphold mutually beneficial cooperation to achieve common prosperity”. 
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He relies on emotions tied to concepts that are not necessarily well-know outside 
East Asia. 
Foreign Minister Li’s text has none of the personal style of Hu’s, in spite of 
being very similar otherwise in terms of the choice of arguments, themes and 
words. Like Hu, he attempts to use “we”, but does not indicate who “we” are 
other than the Party. Phrases like “We need cooperation to maintain common 
security” are paragraph headlines and thus appear more as slogans than as 
effective interpellation of the receiver. In contrast, Hu’s use of “we” has a clear 
audience, namely the state leaders as representatives of member states of the UN 
and the international community. Furthermore, there is no clear personality 
behind the text and no use of “I” or “you” as Hu’s has done – it could have been 
written by anybody and published in any government organ dealing with foreign 
policy. Unlike the two other texts, the sender does not appear as an important 
feature of the text itself in the forms of address or in the choice of themes. In 
other words, the text has an unclear kairos with an ethos that is only present 
because the author’s name is on the document and the publishing organs lends 
their ethos to the author. But the sender has not restricted himself to one medium 
of publication and thus does not address the receiver in any distinct way, and is 
not positioned in any single circumstance to give the text further meaning.  
Certain words, such as “peace”, “harmony”, and “independent” are 
repeated with high frequency and the language appears to be less varied, more 
monotonous and formulaic than the other two. Many of the most repeated words 
are also cultural-keywords, described in chapter 4, or central points from foreign 
policy. “Peace, development and cooperation” appears eight times, “peace” thirty-
two times, and “mutual” “benefit”, “trust” and “cooperation” appear eighteen 
times together. The document, with its weak kairos, lack of personality and 
repetitive style makes it looks more like a policy declaration of the old communist 
genre of policy statements, with only token references to concepts such as 
“democracy” and “human rights”. The only anomaly between this and the old 
style is the attempt at logical argument using specific examples. In the second half 
of the text, Li uses logos arguments shaped as abductive reasoning, or an 
enthymeme, to validate his position. He always declares the conclusion first, and 
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then offers the various arguments. For example, section four of the text is called 
“China's diplomacy continues to make fresh progress under the banner of peace, 
development and cooperation”. It is followed by six arguments which refer to 
specific examples of how China has proved itself to be “a good neighbour, good 
friend and good partner for the surrounding countries”. He taps into the genre of 
economic analysis with his percentage estimates for China’s past and potential 
contribution to the region’s growth. However, what is missing is an explanation of 
why China behaved this way and what motivation exists for the behaviour to 
continue. The audience is invited to fill in this information and make inferences 
that are consistent with the stated conclusion.  
Zheng’s article stands out among the texts in terms of style and 
argumentation. As a part of a peer reviewed academic publication directed at the 
American foreign policy establishment and academics, the style and modes of 
persuasion reflect the common norms for this type of publication. As expected of 
an article in a scientific journal, Zheng uses a scientific approach to argue, 
referring to quantitative data and using less bombastic, more varied academic 
language. He too draws on the genre of economic analysis to validate his claim. 
The article differs greatly from the two other texts in that it deals with the 
problems China faces with regard to population growth and natural resource 
scarcity, and openly acknowledges the heated debate China’s rapid and uneven 
development has generated. His identity and ethos as sender is enhanced by the 
medium, and the particular fact that the message appears as the introduction to a 
special edition of the publication dedicated to China. As the opening text for a 
section of the journal that deals with the same issues as Zheng discusses, it is a 
particularly well-chosen kairos that maximizes the sender’s potential to shape the 
reader’s thinking . In terms of style, the main feature that can be associated with 
classical communist and classical Chinese rhetorical practice is the practice of 
name-giving. Zheng calls the country’s grand strategies for overcoming problems 
associated with its growth the “three transcendences”. This rings similar to other 
policy-naming efforts such as Mao’s ‘Hundred Flowers’ campaign, Deng’s 
‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’, and Jiang’s ‘Three Represents’ 
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5.3 Text 
My close reading of this text is concerned with issues of intertextuality and the 
manifestations of facework in the use of modes of persuasion. I regard facework 
in this connection as an important part of ethos construction. In the following 
discussion I organize the analysis according to the particular discourse the authors 
draw on. They draw mainly on two discourses within which there are several other 
discourses which I have outlined previously. The first discourse is that of US 
foreign policy which includes the various theoretical discourses discussed in 
chapter 3. The second discourse is that of Chinese foreign policy which refers to 
previous PRC foreign policy texts and traditional philosophy. 
 
First, the discourse of US foreign policy texts is referred to directly and indirectly 
through the use of certain concepts, assumptions or arguments stemming from 
the theories and historical behaviour discussed in chapter 3.  
All three authors refer to the concepts of hegemony, power politics and security 
as they are analysed by realist theories. Hu also refers to multipolarity, while 
Zheng concentrates on resource acquisition issues as a security problem. The 
hegemony issue, which is a part of all realist theories, is raised explicitly by Li and 
Zheng. Li says: “China has all along stood for the development of diplomatic 
relations and economic and cultural exchanges with all countries and against 
aggression, hegemony and power politics”. Zheng says: “China will not follow the 
path of Germany leading up to World War I those of Germany and Japan leading 
up to World War II, when these countries violently plundered resources and 
pursued hegemony” and “China does not seek hegemony or predominance in 
world affairs”.  
Both rely on logos arguments structured as topos. The first two statements 
are based on the oppositional model that suggests that because China takes a 
stand against hegemony and power politics, these are necessarily regarded as bad 
and the Chinese strategy must by inference be good. Neither author refers to 
contemporary examples of why power politics is “bad”. Li even leaves out 
examples altogether, talking instead about principles and strategy. Zheng, on the 
other hand chooses to refer to World War I and II for examples. This way neither 
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author explicitly threatens the face of their readers by directly saying that they are 
“bad”. Instead they open up for identification with the Chinese stance against the 
undesirable consequences of power politics. Zheng’s second argument is a form 
of testimonial where the validity of the statement relies on the ethos of the sender. 
He is in the classical position to make such an argument because he is 
acknowledged as an “expert” published in an academic journal. 
The concept of multipolarity stems from balance of power theory. It is the 
official policy of the PRC that multipolarization should develop in order to “boost 
the democratization of international relations” (fmprc.gov.cn). Hu and Li talk 
about the deepening “trend towards a multi-polar world with a globalized … 
economy”. Zheng Bijian, on the other hand, stays away from this term. I interpret 
this as a form of avoidance for political purposes as the desire for multipolarity is 
unlikely to be very popular in Washington. Similarly, references to “security”, 
made implicit to refute allegations of endangering regional security with military 
build-up, appear frequently in Hu and Li’s texts, but is absent from Zheng’s. To 
include references to security problems, even just potential such, is to 
acknowledge that such problems exist and require attention. Admitting this 
directly to the American authorities is far more problematic to China’s face than 
to talk about security in general terms to an international audience. 
References to a “Cold-War mentality” are made in contrast to the 
favourable view of multipolarity. In the same way as they argue against hegemony 
and power politics, “Cold-War mentality” is described as something undesirable 
that must be “abandoned” in favour of a “new security concept”. The interesting 
part about this area of the authors’ argumentation is that it is clear that they are 
referring to the United States as the primary culprit of such a mentality and, in Li’s 
words, “unilateralism and worship of military might”. However, this is never 
stated explicitly, thus avoiding a direct face threat. Leaving the actor out of the 
statement in this way is called nominalization. It is a form of generalization and 
abstraction that is relatively common in genres of governance and “can erase or 
even suppress difference” (Fairclough 2003: 144). It is a way of minimizing the 
potential for face-threat while at the same time giving themselves face by 
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appearing as the voice of reason by advocating the abandonment of outdated 
modes of thinking.    
The question of China’s great power status, which is an important 
precondition for the arguments of al the realist predictions, is only addressed 
directly by Zheng Bijian. His title “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status” 
openly acknowledges the common assumption in US policy circles. The very 
phrase “peaceful rise” is an implicit reference to the assumption that China will 
eventually become a great power, which is perhaps why it was abandoned in 
official PRC government circles. All authors spend considerable energy, not only 
on emphasizing the peaceful nature of China, but also that China is still a 
developing country and will remain so for quite some time – the next fifty years at 
least. Zheng and Li explicitly say that China is a developing country and official 
PRC policy, which has been a catching point on some occasions like at the WTO 
negotiations, also state this (BBC News 2001: 14/01). Li modestly says: 
“It is only under this strategic premise we can achieve the grand goal of 
building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way…China has 
worked hard to promote South-South cooperation and North-South 
dialogue, exploring new areas and new ways of mutually beneficial 
cooperation with other developing countries.”  
He repeats the word “development” or “developing” 59 times throughout his 
text. I interpret the emphasis on China’s “moderate” success to be a form of 
negative politeness because it is self-effacing.  
In addition, it is typical of polite Chinese behaviour as described in chapter 
4 to be modest. Zheng again uses a logos argument using a similarity model of 
topos to show China is a developing country. He presents objectively recognized 
data regarding China’s growth and development. Rates of GDP growth, value of 
foreign trade, dissemination of modernisation, wealth and development provide 
the reasoning. “China has …significantly improved the well-being of its people, 
although its development has often been narrow and uneven”. “In per capita 
terms, China remains a low income developing country, ranked roughly 100th in 
the world. Its impact on the world economy is still limited”. His conclusion from 
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this is that arguments relating to the advent of great powers are not yet applicable 
as “for the next few decades, the Chinese nation will be preoccupied with securing 
a more comfortable and decent life for its people”. 
This claim is further supported by the claim that China is not a dissatisfied 
state, as is feared by some realists. The claim is made implicitly by emphasizing 
China’s great commitment to working within and bettering the current system, 
and the lack of benefit to challenging the status quo. Hu says that China is:  
“Always integrating our development with the common progress of mankind, 
we take full advantage of the opportunities brought by world peace and 
development to pursue our own development while going for better 
promotion of world peace and common development through our successful 
development.…China's development, instead of hurting or threatening 
anyone, can only serve peace, stability and common prosperity in the world.” 
Zheng says: “Beijing has stuck to the belief that there are more opportunities than 
challenges for China in today’s international environment”, and that “it would not 
be in China’s interest to exclude the United States from the process” of China’s 
development. This argument is closely tied to the intertextual reference to 
interdependence discussed below. 
The emphasis on satisfaction with the status quo is further enhanced by 
repeated references to democracy and human rights which are central values 
associated with the US as a dominant power in the current system. All three 
authors make explicit references to democracy and democratization in two ways. 
First they address the positive face of the US, which has been at the forefront 
criticizing the PRC for its lack of democratic institutions and human rights 
violations. Li and Hu argue that China stands for “greater democracy and rule of 
law in international relations”. Zheng goes even further, saying that “China will 
continue to advance until it becomes a prosperous, democratic, and civilized 
socialist country”. These are face-saving strategies for Beijing, addressed to the 
positive face of the US because Beijing acknowledges the US’ claim for value of 
democracy as a desirable norm. Second, Hu indirectly criticizes the US for putting 
pressure on China with regard to democratisation. He says “We should… 
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encourage countries to go for mutual emulation instead of deliberate exclusion, 
for mutual learning of respective strong points instead of making fetish a 
particular model”. Similar to the other criticisms above, Hu uses nominalization 
thereby excluding the actor and avoiding a direct face-treat. 
Hu and Li refer explicitly to human rights as part of other arguments. They 
use the term only once each. Hu says: “We should actively promote and protect 
human rights”. This is followed by a list of gaols that may be interpreted as a 
definition of human rights: “make universal education available, achieve gender 
equality, upgrade public health capacity building and ensure the enjoyment of 
equal right and opportunity to all-round development by all”. Li says: “China has 
taken an active part in the work of the United Nations, upholding the authority 
and role of the world body and its Security Council, and conducting extensive 
international cooperation in such fields as counter-terrorism, arms control, 
peacekeeping, development, human rights, law-enforcement, and the 
environment.” He offers no further explanation of what he means by “human 
rights”. These arguments are parts of logos arguments structured as enthymemes. 
Part of the common understanding on which the arguments rely is the definition 
of human rights. Powers (1999 in Lu 2002: 9) observes that the Chinese definition 
of human rights tends to focus on economic and subsistence issues, whereas in 
the West, human rights is understood in terms of political and socialfreedom, as it 
is stated in the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights.  
Hu appears to have taken this discrepancy into account while Li has not. 
This is an example of an enthymeme where the sender and receiver have a 
divergent understanding of the “obvious”. What is on the surface an appeal to 
positive face because it addresses an issue that is of great concern to the US and 
thus an appeal to communality, disguises disagreement. The reference to both 
democracy and human rights is aforms of positive politeness that addresses the 
receiver’s positive face by showing appreciation for the receiver’s ideals and values 
that may actually disguise disagreement.  
 
Two of the most frequently used intertextual references are related to the 
institutional perspective and interdependence. Arguments stemming from these 
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theories are used to implicitly or explicitly address the concerns stemming from 
realist theories articulated in US foreign policy. First, concerning the institutional 
perspective Hu and Li emphasize the stabilizing, problem-solving and security 
aspect of institutions. Hu and Li also link these aspects to the prospect of creating 
a “harmonious world” and generating “mutual benefit and win-win results by 
expanding the convergence of interests of all countries”, as Li says. They use logos 
arguments formed as topos. The particular topos they both use relies on cause and 
effect argumentation. They tie together “peace”, “development” and 
“cooperation”, making one a requirement for the others. Li says: “we need 
cooperation to maintain common security.. we need cooperation to realize 
common development…we need cooperation to promote inter-civilization 
harmony and coexistence”. These are the subheadings to his opening arguments. 
Likewise, Hu says:  
“Observing international responsibility, undertaking the international 
obligation, settling disputes by peaceful means…. These original 
purposes of the United Nations have also become the sure path 
towards lasting peace and universal security in the world”.  
Hu refers to “cooperation” 14 times while Li uses it a total of 46 times. Li refers 
to cooperation as the answer to the issues raised by the US because: “Only 
through international cooperation can we effectively address the common security 
problems facing all countries” 
 By connecting cooperation to interdependence they suggest it is not only 
necessary but beneficial and opting for anything but cooperation would be 
detrimental. Hu says: 
“The promotion of international cooperation for common 
development and win-win results is not only an important purpose of 
the United Nations, but has increasingly become an important way 
for countries to achieve common development and common 
prosperity”.  
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He emphasizes “the trend towards multi-polar world with a globalized 
economy is deepening”. In a logos argument structured as a general topos 
relying on cause and effect argumentation he maintains that:  
“Development has a bearing on the vital interests of the people of all 
countries, and also on the removal of global security threats from their 
sources. Without universal development and common prosperity, our 
world can hardly enjoy tranquillity. The deepening of economic 
globalization has made countries' interests mutually intertwined, and 
their respective development depends more closely on global 
development.” 
He then goes on to argue for improvement, demanding “a multilateral trading 
system that is open, fair and non-discriminatory…”. This is a reference to the 
trade barriers against Chinese goods that have been set up in the EU and the US, 
as well as the export ban on certain goods to China. It is clearly a critical 
comment that again does not explicitly refer to any particular actor, but the 
meaning is still clear because the trade issue was a hot topic throughout 2005 and 
earlier. Li makes a similar point using nominalization when referring to “trade 
frictions” and “unilateral sanctions”: 
 “China believes that all countries should aim to achieve mutual benefit 
and win-win results in their pursuit of development… Economic and 
trade frictions should be properly settled through dialogue, and 
resorting to unilateral sanctions and retaliations at every turn should be 
opposed”.  
The reference to “unilateral sanctions” can only be a reference to the US’s trade 
embargo on sales of advanced technology and military equipment to the PRC. 
Zheng uses the benefit aspect to cooperation as the main argument for 
China’s continued “peaceful rise”. He talks about Chinas strategic choice to 
“embrace economic globalization” and how Beijing has stuck to this strategic 
choice when face with challenges during the Asian financial crisis by opting for 
cooperation with others by “joining the World Trade Organization and 
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deepening reform at home”. This links cooperation to the ideas about the 
reciprocal effects of the flow of money, goods and people across national borders 
advocated by interdependence theory. Zheng’s discussion of globalization is 
exclusively upbeat and occasionally self-deprecatory with regard to China’s pre-
1979 policies. Unlike the other two, he makes no reference to trade frictions and 
only give face through positive politeness strategies consisting of declaring his 
unreserved optimism regarding the development potential and peace-promoting 
forces engendered by economic cooperation. Hu also emphasizes “mutually 
beneficial cooperation to achieve common prosperity”. He refers to this link even 
in the title of his text: “Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and 
Common Prosperity”. Li says of Beijing’s choice that: 
 “It is a path of coordinating domestic development with opening-
up to the outside world, a path that features both the participation 
in peaceful international competition and extensive cooperation 
with other countries. By opting for such a path of development, 
China has committed itself to equality, friendship, mutual benefit 
and win-win cooperation with all countries in the world in keeping 
with the tide of history”. 
Both Hu and Li repeat the phrases “mutual benefit” and “win-win results”. Li is 
especially repetitive, using the terms “mutual trust”, “mutual benefit” and “win-
win” frequently. The overarching claim of all the authors is, as Zheng says, that 
“China’s development depends on world peace – a peace that its development 
will in turn reinforce” and that this is a strategic choice Beijing has made.  
 
Second, Chinese foreign policy discourse refers to both communist texts from the 
past 50 years for PRC foreign policy and the ancient canon of Chinese 
philosophy. Referring to these texts Beijing argues that China is a special case and 
that the analyses which predict a future war with China are not applicable. 
Hu and Li refer directly to the five principles of peaceful coexistence from 
1954 and the long-standing PRC concern with sovereignty. They use the five 
principles to establish precedent. Li says:  
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“In keeping with the spirit of the UN Charter and the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence, China has all along stood for the development 
of diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with all 
countries and against aggression, hegemony and power politics”. 
Hu uses a strikingly similar argument saying: 
 “We will continue to hold high the banner of peace, development and 
cooperation, unswervingly follow the road of peaceful development, 
firmly pursue the independent foreign policy of peace and dedicate 
ourselves to developing friendly relations and cooperation with all 
countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”.  
 This reference to the country’s record as an upholder of peace is a form of ethos 
persuasion, or an attempt to give Beijing face. 
The reference to sovereignty is both a reference to the five principles and 
to the ‘Century of Humiliation’ which is the basis for the concern over 
sovereignty. Their emphasis on sovereignty and independence serves a dual 
function which may not be immediately clear. Because the Chinese concept of 
sovereignty includes its value systems, criticism of its human rights abuses and 
lack of democracy are perceived as attacks on sovereignty. Thus, the frequent 
reference to independence and sovereignty of states can be interpreted as implicit 
answers to such criticism. This is evident in some phrases such as in Hu’s 
statement “Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as respect for 
countries' right to independently choose their own social systems and paths of 
development…”. And Li’s: “The right to independently choose the path of 
development in light of its national conditions is an inalienable right of every 
people, which must be fully respected.” Hu even goes as far as implying that the 
US is making “a fetish of a particular model” of social organization and 
development. I interpret the references to sovereignty as a means of pointing to 
China’s negative face needs. His statement “Differences in history, culture, social 
system and mode of development should not become barriers to exchanges 
between countries, let alone excuses for confrontation” is an attempt to dissuade 
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criticism. Beijing does not wish to be openly criticized or opposed because of their 
value systems, and in turn they will not criticize others. Any criticism, like Hu’s 
implicit criticism of US actions - perhaps referring to Iraq and/or Afghanistan-, 
are answers to criticism of China: “We should all oppose acts of encroachment on 
other countries' sovereignty, forceful interference in a country's internal affairs, 
and willful use or threat of military force.” 
The two discourses above are connected to the Chinese claim of being a 
principled actor that acts as the champion of developing countries. Though 
“development” is a key word for all three authors, it is only Hu and Li who 
discuss the development of other countries as a consideration for China. In 
connection with the interdependence argument discussed above, Hu says:  
“Globalization should benefit all countries, developing countries in 
particular, instead of leading to a more polarized world where the 
poor become poorer and the rich richer… so that the 21st century 
can truly become a ‘century of development for all’ ”.  
Li is the most staunch advocate of China’s principled support for developing 
nations. While Hu is heavily moralistic, Li upholds principles. He underlines 
“Strengthening solidarity and cooperation with developing countries as the basic 
point of China’s diplomacy”. This is the headline to Li’s ethos argument 
structured as a topos relying on definition. He first declares how to interpret the 
data, then he presents the actions of the Chinese government that support the 
conclusion. Standing up as an advocate for principle and moral has been a 
trademark of Chinese diplomacy ever since the establishment of the PRC.  
Remembering the ‘Century of Humiliation’ and the legacy of Marxist-Leninism 
and Mao Zedung’ thought in particular has compelled Beijing to promote itself as 
the champion of developing countries (Wu 2004: 61).   
Zheng devises an argument of his own based on the benefits of 
globalization and the special nature of the Chinese state. He lays claim to the 
notion that China will not follow the path of previous rising powers because it has 
chosen not to do so based on careful analysis of the pros and cons of aggression. 
He points out how Beijing has made deliberate and consistent long-term strategic 
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choices from the beginning of the reform period in 1979. He connects this to 
recent policy called the “three transcendences” plan. This plan consists of three 
strategies to a “peaceful rise”. First, Beijing aims to “build a society of thrift” in 
order to “transcend the old model of industrialization”. They seek to “use 
technology, economic efficiency, low consumption of natural resources … and 
the optimal allocation of human resources” to avoid “bloody wars” over 
resources, “high consumption of energy, and high pollution”. Second, they aim to 
“transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge, as well as the Cold-
War mentality that defined international relations along ideological lines”. He 
again offers assurances that China will not wage war for resources and 
domination, but will “transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, 
development, and cooperation with all countries of the world”. I interpret this last 
statement as an attempt to distance the current leadership of China from the 
ideologically based hostility of the past leadership.  
The third strategy is to “transcend outdated models of social control and 
to construct a harmonious socialist society”. He goes as far as saying China is 
“strengthening its democratic institutions and the rule of law”. The logos 
argument appears as an enthymeme. The tacit assumption on which it rests is 
the concept of long-term thinking which Zheng has in mind. However, China 
and the United States – to whom the texts are mainly directed – have different 
conception of what long-term planning means. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
have conducted a cross-national survey of national values. They especially 
emphasized the difference between long-tem and short-term orientation. Long-
term orientation stands for thrift, respect for circumstances, having a sense of 
shame, willingness to subordinate oneself for a purpose, and perseverance in  
sustained efforts towards slow results. Short-term orientation, on the other 
hand, refers to an emphasis on quick results, social pressures toward spending, 
concern with social status and obligations, personal stability and 
“face”.(Hofstede and Hofstede 2005: 210-212). They found that East Asian 
countries consistently had the most pronounced long-term orientation of all 39 
countries on the survey. Of all the countries, China was ranked the number one 
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long-term oriented country in the survey. In comparison, the United States 
ranked at number 31 below Norway, in 13th place, and Bangladesh 17th place, 
but above countries such as Zimbabwe and Pakistan (Hofstede and Hofstede 
2005: 211). In politics this means that China regards benefits ten or more years 
ahead as being more important than this year’s profit and bottom line. Work 
values focus more on learning, adaptiveness, accountability and self-discipline 
as opposed to rights, achievement and freedom for short-term oriented 
countries (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005: 225). 
Finally, the reference to China’s proud history is an attempt to refer to an 
already established ethos that is recognized as a positive value. Li does so directly 
by saying:  
“Loving peace, honoring promises and living in harmony with all 
others far and near is an important part of China's cultural 
heritage…Believing in harmony without uniformity, China's diplomacy 
has drawn from its 5000-year-old culture inexhaustible wisdom. 
Engraved on the walls of the UN Headquarters in New York is the 
teaching of Confucius over 2000 years ago, often referred to as the 
Golden Rule guiding state-to-state relations.” 
Further references to some of the eight virtues also refer to this peaceful 
history and allude to China’s former status as a great power in the region. 
He further refers to the “socialist nature of the country” as a basis for its 
“adherence to peace, development and cooperation”. 
Hu makes no explicit claim about China’s uniqueness and instead refers to 
the principled nature of Chinese foreign policy, consistency of behaviour and 
desire for peace:  
“Always integrating our development with the common progress of 
mankind, we take full advantage of the opportunities brought by world 
peace and development to pursue our own development while going 
for better promotion of world peace and common development 
through our successful development. China will, as always, abide by the 
purposes and principles of the UN Charter…” 
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While All three authors make a point of avoiding mentioning certain issues 
sensitive to the receivers. The issues that are considered inappropriate differ 
slightly between the texts and I would argue that this is due to the expected 
audience and medium of choice.  
5. 4 The new Chinese ethos 
I have documented Beijing’s use of rhetoric and politeness as well as their use of 
genre in their ethos-building efforts. My findings indicate that Beijing’s rhetoric is 
tapping into discourses that have previously been the domain of Western powers, 
with the US at the forefront. However, they do this in a way that is, in varying 
degrees, slightly different from the normative behaviour of the US and Europe, 
never quite letting go of the old habits of communication for which they have 
become notorious. Beijing has also dug deep into its own past, borrowing heavily 
from both the communist and the ancient canon in order to reinvent their foreign 
policy. They draw especially on Confucian values and language to frame their new 
policies in what appears to be an attempt to transform the Chinese ethos into that 
of a classical Confucian gentleman (junzi). The focus of this new ethos is not 
surprisingly the new cooperative, morally upstanding and mutualy profit-seeking 
Beijing.  
David Shambaugh (2005) has reduced China’s new regional posture to four 
mutually supporting pillars consisting of participation in regional organisations, 
establishing strategic partnerships and deepening bilateral relationships, expanding 
regional economic ties and reducing distrust and anxiety in the security sphere 
(Shambaugh 2005: 30). My brief analysis above support these findings and 
suggests the strategy is also used beyond the Asia-Pacific region. Shambaugh 
(2005: 34) also notes that the “inept and indoctrinated Chinese diplomats cut off 
from their resident societies” are no longer found. Instead, diplomatic activities 
are adjusted at all levels and activity levels have increased and diversified. There 
can be no doubt that Beijing is acquiring new skills. For example, during Hu 
Jintao’s recent visit to the US, Chinese news media were eager to point out Hu’s 
“human touch” with him donning a baseball cap and hugging corporate leaders. 
At the same time Chinese television edited out the Falungong protests and 
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newspapers made no mention of the disagreement over human rights, leaving no 
doubt as to their degree of liberation from old habits (BBC News 2005: 21/04) 
However, this new ethos is not necessarily a great success in all arenas as 
some important aspects, such as the extent of China’s long-term thinking, may not 
come across well. On the other hand, I would argue that to receivers in the US 
foreign policy establishment, the distasteful flavour of past Chinese foreign policy 
discourse is still present. The texts have, as Bakhtin put it, the “taste” of a 
profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work…each word tastes of 
the context and the contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life; all words 
and forms are populated by intentions. Contextual overtones (generic, 
tendentious, individualistic) are inevitably in the word.” (Bakhtin 1981: 293). 
Beijing has attempted to adapt its rhetoric to Western political discourse in terms 
of style and choice of themes. However, my small selection of texts shows how 
old and new diplomatic styles coexist. They have not succeeded in playing the 
Western diplomatic game in a way that the US finds thoroughly convincing. 
Zheng may be admitted to exclusive US forums such as Foreign Affairs and 
shows he masters the genre. Hu and Li, on the other hand, retain more of the old 
communist style and less accessible dogma, with Li as the most stereotypical 
example. In addition, there is not necessarily consistency between words and 
actions in the eyes of the observer. As US Deputy Secretary of State Robert 
Zoellick said ahead of Hu’s visit to the US in April 2006: “China seems to be 
saying the right things,…But the process of change seems agonisingly slow." 
(BBC News 2006: 19/04). 
Beijing carefully words its diplomatic statements, as indeed do most states, 
to avoid offence. The particular characteristic of Chinese diplomacy is that they 
have so many things to be careful about and, at the same time, a wish to be more 
assertive. The solution they have adopted is to look after the face of their 
colleagues on the international arena, never openly criticizing yet leaving the 
audience in little doubt as to the meaning of critical statements. The avoidance of 
direct criticism is not just related to the kairos, or medium of choice, for the 
authors. It is a relatively common phenomenon in Chinese politics and tends to 
trickle down to the media as well. For example, during George W. Bush’s visit to 
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China in November 2005, the Western press wrote about his emphasis on greater 
political and religious freedom and lack of progress in contentious areas of trade 
and finance. The Chinese press on the other hand made no mention of 
disagreements whatsoever. Instead they ran headlines like “Leaders highlight 
common interests” (Lim 2005).  
It emerges from Hu’s assertiveness - though the criticism is still indirect - 
that he, and the rest of Beijing’s leadership, believe that China has the economic, 
diplomatic and military wherewithal to compete with the US. Now, Instead of 
passively countering American efforts at an “anti-Chinese containment policy”, 
they take an offensive approach (Lam 2006: 2).  
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6. Conclusion 
“Indirect tactics, efficiently applied are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow 
of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, 
they pass away to return once more” 
  From The Art of War by Sun Tzu, Chapter V. 6 
 
The intension in this thesis was to look beyond the regular realms of political 
science to the type of influences that stimulate our thinking about issues. More 
specifically, I wanted to study a particular moment in current China debate and 
how the parties attempt to guide the discussion in certain directions. I chose to 
study this debate for the very reason that the debate itself exists: because 
regardless of the direction of China’s growth, its development has the potential to 
affect profoundly the world we live in. Above, I have illustrated how the Chinese 
authorities have worked to improve their national ethos in order to be in a better 
position to influence how the US and the world think about the country’s growth 
and behaviour. Beijing has engaged in a diplomatic dialogue with the US and other 
actors on the international arena where they compete for influence over the 
discourse. The two parties, China and the US, are involved in a struggle for the 
power and capacity to define the nature of China’s evolution. I use Stuart Hall’s 
concept of ‘primary definer’ to interpret my findings. A primary definer is a 
person or institution that gains the most dominant voice in a discourse, who 
establishes the initial definition of the topic in question. A primary definer requires 
arguments against it to make use of its definition of ‘what is at issue’. The 
framework set by the primary definer is the starting-point for discussion and it is 
extremely difficult to alter fundamentally once is has been established since the 
framework sets the terms of reference within which any further debate takes place 
(Hall et all 1978: 58). In a political context, Neumann (2001: 18) calls this the 
‘power of concepts’2 or the “ability to determine, institutionalize and activate 
concepts” in a way that has significant ramifications for political actions. It may be 
regarded as a type of ‘soft power’ to lead the audience’s thoughts in the desired 
direction.  
                                                 
2  Begrepsmakt 
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 My analysis suggests that Beijing is following the US lead in terms of ideas 
an concepts to which they must relate. Though the texts show attempts to bring in 
other discourses, such as Confucianism, the PRC is still compelled to use the 
political theories outlined in chapter 3 and the US discourse on China as a starting 
point for recreating their own ethos. In addition, they are adopting, if only slowly, 
Western norms of behaviour and interaction to suit their purposes. The authors 
work hard to distance China from the discourses of hegemony and power politics. 
Yet at the same time, they admit the legitimacy of these ideas. As Nixon found to 
his detriment, it is too late to yell “I am not a crook” when everyone is already 
thinking in those terms (Kilpatrick 1973). Though Beijing has tried to turn this to 
their advantage by appealing to the logic of interdependence and institutional 
theories, the going has proved tough.  
In 2005, the top brass of the CCP leadership went on a diplomatic 
offensive in order to stave off growing apprehension and inopportune responses 
to Chinese moves on the international arena. It has not been my aim to determine 
whether Beijing’s proactive diplomacy is merely a charm offensive or whether it 
signals a fundamental alteration of course in the long run. However, it is the case 
that, for a long time, Beijing’s efforts to articulating its purpose in an appropriate 
manner on the foreign policy arena have been fraught with problems. As 
Washington Post commentator and director of China Center at the Graduate 
Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Lanxin Xiang, said “When the 
Chinese invent a foreign policy theme, they often deploy coded language that 
leads to more confusion than clarity on the international front.” (Xiang 2006). 
Though they have been seen to have made an effort to play the diplomatic game 
dominated by the US and Europe, many of the old patterns are still present. 
Beijing relies on politeness behaviour manifested in carefully worded 
rhetoric in order to avoid direct confrontation. Though it has expanded their 
arena of operation and enriched their bank of reference, it still depends on 
concepts and assumptions that do not necessarily translate well. Chinese 
diplomatic behaviour emanating from Beijing is not always consistent with the 
new profile in terms of genre, though there is a great deal of consistency with 
regard to themes and phrasing. Probably the most problematic feature of Beijing’s 
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ethos construction efforts is the extent to which they rely on concepts where the 
understanding is not the same. China and the US have a history of such 
miscommunication. Previously, it was their different understanding of the 
American interference in China during the Century of Humiliation (Lampton 
2003: 252-253). Today, it is, amongst other things, their understanding of time 
perspectives and human rights. Change may seem “agonisingly slow” to the 
United States while Beijing cannot see any problem and is unwilling to speed up 
the process. And Beijing may feel that it is actually addressing human rights as 
they see it, in the time perspective it regards as appropriate. 
Revolutionizing a state’s foreign policy is rarely conceivable, especially over 
a short period of time. Beijing has attempted to adapt its rhetorical style, but has 
failed to deal with some of the fundamental differences in assumptions and 
norms. Leaders have dug deep into the communist and ancient Chinese cultural 
canons while echoing liberal ethos principles like human rights and diplomacy. 
This supports Fairclough’s (2000: 3) argument that “political differences have 
always been constituted as differences in language, and political struggles have 
always been struggles over the dominant language”.  
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